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Author: Bianca Vaz Mondo
Hertie School of Governance

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Democratization and corruption: the state of the art

Bianca Vaz Mondo
Hertie School of Governance
Friedrichstraße 180
10117 Berlin, Germany
Executive Summary

This chapter discusses critically the main contributions of the literature on the relationship between democratization and corruption, focusing on the perspective of how the former is expected to affect the latter and highlighting the different hypotheses and empirical findings presented by the most relevant and recent scholarly work in this line of research. Additionally, the discussion introduced here refers to a number of conceptual issues that remain obscure in the existing literature, with regards to the concept of both corruption and democratization, but at the same time stressing the gaps related to the latter, as to complement other contributions of the report that more thoroughly explore the different conceptual approaches to corruption.

The literature surveyed and the analysis presented in the text illustrates some of the central issues of interest raised throughout the report. Firstly, the branch of the literature reviewed in the main part of this section of the report is similarly concerned with the issue of comparability in the study of corruption. The impact of democratization on corruption is most often analyzed from a cross-national comparative perspective in the recent literature, and a universal concept of corruption is an essential foundation for studies of this nature. This is also an important matter for the less ubiquitous in-depth single-country studies examining the effects of democratization on corruption over longer periods of time, which have their contribution to the accumulated knowledge on this topic much potentialized by the possibility of later comparison with similar studies in other countries and contexts. Therefore, with regards to the discussion contrasting universal and relativistic perspectives on corruption, the topics addressed by this section of the report make a strong case for the former.

At the same time, it becomes clear that the study of the relationship between democratization and corruption is much negatively affected by the blurred boundaries between the two concepts and by their mutual normative character. In fact, the normative perspective argued for in this report with regards to the concept of corruption has great impact on the analysis of how democratization and corruption are associated, given that part of the normative foundation attributed to corruption is similarly linked to democratization (or democracy) in some of its broadest conceptions. In this discussion, the distinction between access to and exercise of power evoked in the report and in the literature reviewed may offer useful categories for a conceptual strategy allowing for a clearer distinction between the two concepts. In this case, a more restricted view of democratization stressing its dimension of how access to power is conducted becomes more easily compatible with a view of corruption centered on the violation of the principle of impartiality in the exercise of power, for the purpose of analyzing hypothesized causal relationships between the two. Another possible approach that this section of the report raises refers to a more fragmented understanding of democratization that focuses on how its different dimensions may affect corruption through distinct concrete institutional mechanisms. These and other alternatives providing for a clearer conceptual separation between these two phenomena should be explored in future research in order to avoid some of the conceptual pitfalls that have been identified in the existing research on their relationship.

The stream of research reviewed in this part of the report is also closely related to part of the empirical work conducted as part of the ANTICORRP project, in particular in WP 3 (Corruption and governance improvement in global and continental perspectives). As is the case of that Work Package, the literature surveyed here embodies research questions ultimately related to a central puzzle of interest in corruption research, namely the determinants of this phenomenon. In WP3, this subject is comprehensively addressed from a global comparative perspective and with selected case studies seeking to explain successful experiences in reducing corruption, in which the democratic development of each country is also considered as a potentially strong explanatory factor.
Introduction

In the past two decades, corruption has become one of the main concerns in the international development agenda, in particular due to mounting evidence of its detrimental effects in terms of economic development and social welfare (Holmberg et al., 2009; Mauro, 1997). As a consequence, increasing efforts and resources have been directed towards reducing corruption in developing countries. Nevertheless, many evaluations point out that a large part of anti-corruption efforts has been ineffective (Heilbrunn, 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson et al., 2010). In fact, recent assessments of countries’ performance in controlling corruption show that very few countries have experienced significant improvements in the last decade (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Moreover, corruption perception indicators show that the nations that have managed to achieve very low levels of corruption are not very numerous either.

A few streams of the literature have addressed this generally pessimistic picture in different ways, but two in particular have attempted to understand the very foundations of this phenomenon. One of them has focused on understanding the underlying causes of corruption, and has gained greater momentum with the development of various aggregate corruption indicators at a cross-national level since the mid-1990s. This literature has mainly relied on a broad definition of corruption as the misuse or abuse of public power for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Treisman, 2000). In this line of research, historical, cultural, economic and political factors have been explored as potentially explaining the large variation of corruption levels observed across countries (see Andvig et al., 2001; Lambsdorff et al., 2005; Seldadyo & de Haan, 2006 for a review). While some of these findings have suggested factors that could contribute to improving anti-corruption policy-making, others have been less policy relevant.

Another more recent stream of research, to some extent critical of the first, has sought to conceptualize and understand not the determinants of corruption per se, but of its opposite. Focusing on the concept of good governance more broadly, this literature is concerned with how a handful of societies have historically managed to achieve a governance regime characterized by a low corruption equilibrium. These studies thus take a more societal and historical institutional approach to understanding this phenomenon, and generally define

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1 Factors related to economic and public sector policy, such as government spending, public service remuneration and economic freedom, have contributed to heated debates about potential policy interventions to curb corruption, whereas findings regarding colonial legacy, religion, and ethnic composition, among other historically determined characteristics of the society, clearly contribute less to generate new insights for anti-corruption policy formulation.
corruption in terms of a violation of norms of impartiality and universalism in the exercise of public authority (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, 2011; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008).

In both of these streams, democratization has been highlighted, theoretically and empirically, as a main factor associated to both cross-national variation in corruption and changes in corruption patterns over time. The literature on causes of corruption has found a strong association between more advanced and consolidated democracies and lower levels of corruption (Pellegata, 2012; Serra, 2004; Treisman, 2000, 2007). The historical institutional literature has also emphasized democratization as an important part of a society’s reaching a low corruption equilibrium, understood as part of a broader transition to a good governance regime characterized by the predominance of a norm of ethical universalism and impartiality in the treatment of citizens by the state (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011, p. 10): “It is hard to imagine how a government can strive for recognition in good governance without engaging in a process of democratization” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011, p. 8). More specifically, Mungiu-Pippidi proposes a relationship between increased political pluralism and control of corruption in a society, as part of its transition to good governance over time (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, p. 89, 2011, p. 29).

Nevertheless, despite a burgeoning literature on the topic, existing research has only scratched the surface of this relationship, and several questions remain partly unanswered and unexplored. Firstly, at a conceptual level the debate on the link between democratization and corruption is still fuzzy, and a clear discussion of what is understood by both the dependent and the independent variables is often lacking in a large part of the scholarly work on this issue. Secondly, most studies examine this relationship at a high level of aggregation and propose multiple, and at times contradictory, causal mechanisms through which an effect of democratization on corruption could take place. As a consequence, the extensive empirical literature has explored a number of contrasting hypotheses on the nature of this relationship, offering some insightful findings, and other less conclusive ones.

In order to make sense of what is known so far about the link between democratization and corruption, the next sections present an overview of the aforementioned controversial points and their treatment in the literature. Section II reviews the main hypotheses and findings present in the relevant literature. Section III discusses the related conceptual issues and gaps. Section IV concludes, pointing to open questions and challenges ahead for future research on this topic.
Theory and empirical findings: a review of the literature

In the literature on democratization and corruption, a number of hypotheses have been put forth about how the former should affect the latter. This section summarizes the main theoretical formulations and the empirical evidence associated with each of these hypotheses, in order to provide an overview of what is known so far and what remains unclear based on existing research.

The linear effect hypotheses

The simplest hypothesis discussed in the literature claims that democratization should lead to lower corruption, or in other words, that it has a linear negative effect on corruption. This rather optimistic expectation derives from the very philosophical and normative ideals of democracy, based on principles such as equality, justice, citizenship, openness and accountability, i.e. values that are antithetical to corruption (Morris, 2009). It can also be traced back to theories of democratic representation, which portray representative democracy as a system where rulers are systematically induced to act according to the interests of the citizenry (Przeworski et al., 1999). As corruption, by all definitions, implies actions that benefit private interests at the expense of the collective interest, true representation would in theory preclude corrupt acts. More specifically, democracy should induce representation on the part of elected officials because voters can ultimately threaten to remove them from office, should they act in ways detrimental to the public interest (Przeworski et al., 1999)\(^2\).

This hypothesis is also linked to the public choice literature, which has explored how the introduction of elections and political competition changes the incentive structure of politicians (Montinola & Jackman, 2002). Under the assumption that politicians are self-interested and care about retaining office, incumbents would anticipate sanctioning by voters and therefore act in a way representative of their interests and refrain from corruption (Adsera et al., 2003; Andvig et al., 2001; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Pellegata, 2012)\(^3\). Moreover, electoral competition would give the opposition an incentive to expose their adversaries’

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\(^2\) Nevertheless, several contributions in the volume edited by Przeworski et al. (1999) argue that the retrospective sanctioning of incumbents by voters does not always take place.

\(^3\) Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), among others, examine the conditions under which voters are able to control politicians through this mechanism.
involvement in corruption (Andvig et al., 2001; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Lederman et al., 2005; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Seldadyo & de Haan, 2006)\(^4\).

Additionally, democratic freedoms and transparency should contribute to reducing the information asymmetry between voters and office holders and are thus expected to foster voters’ ability to monitor the government (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Lederman et al., 2005; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000). Finally, the adoption of mechanisms of checks and balances associated with democratic regimes is expected to restrict the ability of government officials to engage in corruption (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Lederman et al., 2005; Seldadyo & de Haan, 2006).

A second hypothesis on the effect of democratization on corruption claims that the duration of democratic regimes is negatively associated with corruption. This is linked to the argument that democratization implies, in the long term, the consolidation of democratic norms that foster a rejection of corruption by the citizenry, which should also contribute to reinforcing social monitoring of the government (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000). Additionally, a longer experience with democracy contributes to more solid and established mechanisms of accountability that constrain corruption (Lederman et al., 2005; Pellegata, 2012).

Although the theoretical discussion around the first hypothesis refers to the effect of democratization and implies that democratic regimes are less corrupt in comparison to non-democratic ones, recent empirical analyses have to a large extent used continuous indicators of democracy or the strength of democratic institutions, thus essentially testing for the effect of different “degrees” of democracy and comparing corruption levels not only between democracies and non-democracies, but also across what may be construed as different stages of democratization. Such studies present rather mixed findings, with results often varying according to different measures of democracy or the co-variants controlled for in the models.

Some authors fail to find a statistically significant relationship between democracy and corruption. Goldsmith (1999), for instance, examines this hypothesis for a cross-section of 34 low- and medium-income countries and finds no statistically significant effect of democracy—measured with Freedom House’s freedom indicator—on corruption, once per capita income is controlled for. Treisman (2000) also tests for the effect of democracy on corruption as part of a more comprehensive model of determinants of corruption. In cross-sectional analyses of

\(^4\) Kunicová and Mattes (2006) develop a model to show that this is not always the case, however, because competitors may collude, share rents or alternate in power.
different samples, varying from 34 to 64 countries, he similarly finds the estimated effect of
democracy—both measured as a dummy variable of democratic status in 1995 and as the
Political Rights index from Freedom House—to be not statistically significant when taking into
account a series of other potential explanatory variables, including economic development,
trade openness, legal tradition, Protestantism, colonial past, among others.

Other scholars have found some evidence of a linear negative of democracy on corruption, but
this is not always robust. Paldam (2002) estimates the effect of democracy on corruption for a
cross-section of almost 100 countries, taking into account the impact of cultural areas and
economic factors (e.g. per capita, economic growth, income inequality) as well. He finds that
the effect of democracy is sensitive to model specification, once economic factors are
controlled for. In a 2007 paper that essentially replicates his initial analysis with more recent
data and much larger samples (up to 162 countries), Treisman (Treisman, 2007) does find
significant results, but they are not robust to changes in the democracy indicator (Treisman,
2007). Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) examine the same relationship for a cross-section of 50
countries, also using Freedom House’s freedom indicator for democracy, and find a negative
association between corruption and the strength of democratic institutions, but it is mostly
significant at the 10%-confidence level, while controlling for economic freedom, average
income, trade, Protestantism and age of the democratic regime. Adsera et al. (2003) also
estimate this effect in a more sophisticated analysis, with panel data from the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the period 1980-1995 (averaged for each 5-year period) for
more than 100 countries, and find results not to be robust to changes in the model
specification. Bohara et al. (2004) introduce an alternative measure of democracy that
emphasizes political participation over time and find stronger democracy to be significantly
associated with lower corruption both in cross-section and panel analyses. Finally, Lederman
et al. (2005) similarly use panel data to conduct their analysis, also based on the ICRG

The countries in the sample are divided across six cultural groups: Western Europe, Latin America, former
Communist countries, Africa, Oriental countries, and a residual group with remaining countries (Paldam, 2002,
p. 227).

Alternatively to Freedom House’s Political Rights index, Treisman (Treisman, 2007) uses the Polity IV
Democracy indicator.

These authors estimate the effect of democracy on corruption together with a variable called free newspaper
circulation, which is measured as an interaction between the level of democratic liberties and the newspaper
circulation in the respective countries (Adsera et al., 2003). The authors do not discuss the effect of collinearity
between the two variables and how it may reduce the significance level of the effect of democracy.

Based on Dahl’s discussion of the main dimensions of polyarchy, these authors create a measure of compound
democracy, generated as “the cumulative sum of the product of participation and competition for each country
for each year using yearly participation (turnout/population) and competition (100- percent vote for largest party)
data collected by Vanhanen (1990)”, with 1950 as the starting date.
corruption index for the 1984-1999 period, but they do find a significant negative effect of
democracy—measured as a binary variable—on corruption, both for ordered probit\(^9\) and
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, while controlling for a series of cultural, policy-
related and development factors and other political institutional characteristics. However,
when they replicate this analysis for a cross-section of 70 countries with corruption data from
the World Bank for 1999, the effect of democracy on corruption becomes insignificant.

Evidence supporting the second hypothesis, on the other hand, appears to be more robust\(^10\).
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) also test a variable of the length of democracy in their sample
of countries, and find this to have a significant effect on corruption levels at the 10%-level in
most of their models. Treisman (2000) finds no effect of a variable measuring years of
democracy for his sample of countries, but does find a statistically significant negative effect
of a dummy variable for whether the country has been a democracy uninterruptedly from
1950 to 1995. Lederman et al. (2005) also consider the effect of democratic stability—
measured as the time of uninterrupted democratic experience—on corruption levels, and find it
to have a significant negative association with corruption throughout the different models
estimated. Pellegata (2012) also finds supportive evidence for the effect of cumulative
democratic experience on corruption, uninterrupted or not, for a cross-section of 112
countries. Even stronger support for this hypothesis is presented by Serra (2004), who
conducts an Extreme-Bounds Analysis of 16 determinants of corruption for a sample of 62
countries, and finds the negative effect of uninterrupted democracy—measured as a dummy
variable for the period 1950-1995—to be one of the five determinants to remain robust to
different model specifications\(^11\).

The non-linear effect hypothesis

\(^9\) This method of estimation is justified by the fact that the ICRG corruption measure varies discretely, and not
continuously, between 0 to 6 (Lederman et al., 2005).
\(^10\) At the same time, there are a few case studies that explore some counter-examples of this thesis (e.g. India)
and question the assumption that a longer experience with democracy is naturally associated with deeper
\(^11\) Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) is a strong test of the robustness and sensitivity of explanatory variables
through a series of estimations changing the composition of the set of control variables included. If the
coefficients of the variable of interest remain statistically significant in the same direction from its extreme upper
bound (its highest value plus twice its standard error) to its extreme lower bound (its lowest value minus twice its
standard error), the variable is considered to be robust to specification changes. In the analysis conducted by
Serra (2004), the other four explanatory variables found to be robust are economic development, political
instability, Protestantism and colonial heritage.
Other studies have proposed that democratization has a non-linear effect on corruption, whereby it first results in increasing corruption and only in the long term, at a more advanced stage, does it help to curb corruption. Two different sets of theoretical explanations can be associated with this idea. The first one implies that the non-linear effect is explained by a lagged negative effect of democratization on corruption, i.e. the mechanisms through which democratization helps to curb corruption take a long time to be set in motion. One of the arguments behind this proposition is that, at early stages of democratization, the mechanism of electoral control is still weak and is not able to guarantee effective accountability between voters and politicians (Pellegata, 2012). It is also argued that top-down control exercised by authoritarian governments over the economic and political spheres contribute to keeping corruption under control, but once these forms of control collapse after the transition to democratic rule, other mechanisms of control such as accountability structures and checks and balances are not yet fully consolidated, which leads to an increase of corruption in the short term (Andvig et al., 2001; Bäck & Hadenius, 2008).

The second set of explanations, on the other hand, relies on the notion that different developments associated with democratization may have contradictory effects on corruption (Blake & Morris, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). This view similarly considers that the aforementioned mechanisms of control take time to consolidate and to produce the expected negative effect on corruption. At the same time, though, it challenges the argument that electoral competition has predominantly positive effects on corruption. Instead, it claims that electoral competition and the “uncertainty” associated with it create both opportunities and incentives for politicians to subject to increasing pressures from business or to engage in electoral corruption through vote-buying, clientelism and illegal party-financing in order to maximize voter support (Blake & Morris, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Eventually, once solid mechanisms of checks and balances, increased transparency and a free press are in place, this may be counterbalanced and surpassed by an effect in the opposite direction (Goldsmith, 1999; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Sung, 2004).

Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) also discusses the non-linear effect of democratization on corruption, but offers an alternative explanation. In her model, the transition from authoritarian, patrimonial regimes to incipient democracies rarely represents a challenge to the fundamental

12 The political machines described by Scott (1972) illustrate this dynamics. Similarly, documented cases of illegal party financing and clientelistic networks even in more advanced democracies (Della Porta & Mény, 1997) may be seen as evidence of this.
social norm of particularism and unequal treatment that governs these regimes. Instead, the introduction of political competition contributes to breaking the former monopoly of power of the ruling elite, only to allow other elite groups to compete for state rents\textsuperscript{13}. In this situation of “competitive particularism”, corruption increases, and democratization only brings about a reduction of corruption once the introduction of elections is followed by normative changes that weaken social acceptability of particularism and push for stronger accountability and universalism (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, pp. 89–90).

The non-linear effect hypothesis was largely supported on earlier case studies on new democracies after the so-called Third Wave of democratization, showing that democratic transition was followed by an apparent increase in corruption in several countries (Geddes & Neto, 1992; Harriss-White & White, 1996; Mohtadi & Roe, 2003; Moran, 2001; Rock, 2007; Weyland, 1998; Whitehead, 2002)\textsuperscript{14}. Rock (2007) mentions examples from Indonesia and Thailand, where the democratic transition led to the collapse of centralized corruption networks and to increased corruption by local political actors. Sidel (1996) also discusses how local bossism appeared to have re-emerged in Thailand and the Philippines after democratization\textsuperscript{15}. Finally, studies on the re-democratization of Latin American countries after military dictatorships also point to evidence of an increase in corruption, especially in the realm of political financing and clientelism (Little, 1996; Whitehead, 2002)\textsuperscript{16}. A more recent study on the impact of democratization on corruption in Mexico also corroborates this hypothesis. Focusing on the changes that took place in the country’s political environment after the alternation in power in 2000, when the former hegemonic party Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) lost the presidential elections and stepped down after more than seven decades of dominance, Morris (2009) finds that democratization has brought about new opportunities for corruption through state capture, new forms of clientelism and campaign finance.

\textsuperscript{13} The economic literature on rent-seeking also discusses how political liberalization in the beginning opens up access to rent-seeking activities and leads to an increase in the number of rent-seekers (Mohtadi & Roe, 2003).

\textsuperscript{14} A large part of these studies makes reference to numerous corruption scandals that came to light a few years after the democratic transitions they examine (Whitehead, 2002). However, due to the lack of straightforward measures of corruption, it is impossible to distinguish whether such cases represent in fact an increase of corruption or merely of its visibility, due to increased press freedom, for instance (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Weyland, 1998).

\textsuperscript{15} A similar structure is described by Shleifer and Vishny (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) as the “industrial organization” of corruption, illustrated by examples from post-Communist Russia, India and some African countries.

\textsuperscript{16} It is important to notice that several of these studies also attribute the perceived increase in corruption in those countries to economic liberalization and new opportunities for corruption linked to processes of deregulation and privatization, for instance (Whitehead, 2002).
The studies mentioned above have contributed with qualitative evidence of increased corruption in a number of younger democracies, but they largely concentrated on a short time horizon after democratic transition, covering mostly the first decade after the regime change. Therefore, none of them illustrate fully the hypothesized non-linear nature of the effect of democratization on corruption as predicted by the theoretical arguments previously discussed, in the sense that no “turning point”, to the effect that corruption eventually is reduced as a consequence of stronger democratic institutions, is documented for those cases. More recent comparative studies testing this hypothesis for a larger sample of countries, on the other hand, have offered more consistent evidence of a non-linear association between democratization and corruption.

Montinola and Jackman (2002) were the first to find statistical evidence of a quadratic relationship between democracy and corruption examining two cross-sections of 51 and 66 countries, respectively, while controlling for size of government, per capita income, oil exporting countries and regional dummies. They found non-democratic states to be slightly less corrupt than partial democracies, and a negative association between levels of democracy and corruption to exist only for countries where democratic institutions are stronger. Treisman (Treisman, 2007) partly supports these findings, but notes that the marginal effect of advances in democratization on corruption at intermediate levels of democracy is erratic and inconsistent. Bäck and Hadenius (2008) explore a similar relationship and, while they focus on the effect of democracy—measured as a composite indicator including both Freedom House and Polity democracy indices—on state capacity, the dependent variable is also operationalized with corruption indicators. Similarly, they find evidence for this non-linear effect for a panel of 125 countries over a period of 19 years, with a positive effect of democracy on corruption at low levels of democracy and a negative effect at high levels of democracy, while controlling for per capita income, openness to trade and British colonial heritage. Pellegata (2012) also tests and finds statistical support for this non-linear effect. Rock (2007), in turn, tests this hypothesis in panel regressions with samples between 75 and 104 countries, considering alternative measures of democracy, including one corresponding to the duration of democracy and another multiplying measures of duration and strength of democratic institutions—both based on Polity IV data. He finds a significant non-linear effect for the duration of democracy and for the combined measure. Saha (2008) also tests the non-linear

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17 Their variable state capacity is measured by combining ICRG’s Bureaucratic Quality and Control of Corruption indices.
effect of different measures of democracy on corruption for a panel of 100 countries and finds it to be significant for all different measures. Finally, Sung (2004) tests other functional forms for this relationship in a sample of 103 countries and finds statistical evidence for a cubic relationship between democracy and corruption, although this is more difficult to interpret in substantive terms.

What is intriguing in these studies is that they have also shown that the negative effect of democracy on corruption comes about rather at higher democracy levels, thus after countries are more advanced in their democratic consolidation. This is in a way corroborated by findings of a negative association between the “age” of a democratic regime and its level of corruption, discussed above. These empirical findings thus suggest that a negative effect of democracy on corruption is observed only after a country passes a certain threshold of consolidation of its democratic institutions.

**The conditional effect hypotheses**

Finally, some researchers have attempted to explain the non-uniform effect of democratization on corruption by arguing that it is in fact dependent on other factors. Charron and Lapuente (2010) subscribe to the classic political economy assumption that democratization leads politicians to become more responsive to citizens’ demands, but argue that those demands vary according to the level of economic development in a society. In poorer societies, people’s preferences are likely to favour immediate consumption instead of future consumption. Therefore citizens would be more likely to demand the provision of goods through clientelistic exchanges and patronage, instead of the allocation of public resources to improving administrative capacity and the provision of public goods in the long term. In richer societies, on the other hand, citizens would be more likely to pressure rulers to invest in improving quality of government and reducing corruption, because they are more willing to afford the short term costs of policies in this direction (Charron & Lapuente, 2010, p. 451). The empirical analysis conducted by the authors for a panel of 127 countries finds evidence of the hypothesized interaction effect, with a negative effective of democracy on their indicator of quality of government—also a combination of ICRG’s Bureaucratic Quality

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18 The author uses Freedom House’s Political Rights, Civil Liberties and Press Freedom indices to develop indicators of narrow and broad democracy, where the former includes only the Political Rights index, and the latter consists of an interaction of all three. Moreover, the effect of each measure on corruption is also tested individually.
and Control of Corruption, as used by Bäck and Hadenius (2008)—at lower levels of per capita income and a positive effect at higher levels of per capita income. They also control for alternative hypotheses, including the one for an effect of the duration of democracy and for a quadratic relationship between democratization and corruption, and find no evidence to support them.

Other authors have proposed that the effect of democratization on corruption is also non-linear, but varies with the degree of media freedom existent in a society. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) develop a formal game-theoretical model where higher quality of democratic institutions contributes to reducing corruption, and this effect is potentialized under increased media freedom. In their model, voters choose between “good” and “bad” politicians, where the former act in people’s best interest and the latter in their own self-interest. The role of media freedom is to improve voters’ knowledge of corrupt behavior by the incumbent, allowing them to update their belief of the incumbent’s type and accordingly make their voting decision for the next term. The empirical tests to the model’s predictions, taking into account data for 126 countries from 1980 to 2008, find strong support for the complementary effect of democratization and media freedom on corruption.

Similarly, Kalenborn and Lessmann (Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2012) test the joint effect of democratization and press freedom on corruption levels for a large sample of countries, both in cross-section and panel regressions. They argue that both a free press and democratic elections are necessary for voters to effectively exercise accountability against corrupt politicians, as the former provides for detection of corrupt behavior and the latter for punishment by voters. In accordance with the principal-agent framework, they discuss that a free press has mainly the role of reducing the information asymmetry between voters and politicians. As Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012), they also find empirical evidence to support the conditional effect of democratization and press freedom on corruption. However, their econometric analysis finds that the effect of democratization can be negative in the absence of free media.

Yet another strand of research considers that the effect of democratization may be conditional on the institutional design of democratic regimes, i.e. “the devil is in the details” (Morris, 19). Evidence for a significant independent negative effect of press freedom on corruption has also been presented in the literature on determinants of corruption (Adsera et al., 2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Treisman, 2007).

20 In the authors’ definition, high quality democratic institutions imply that the incumbent is likely to stay in office when supported by the people, and unlikely to stay in office without popular support (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2012, p. 2).
This stream in the literature is mainly concerned with explaining variation in corruption outcomes across democracies, and examines how contrasting institutional features of democracies affect corruption levels. The theoretical arguments behind these analyses usually emphasize two potential effects of certain political institutions: (a) they may influence the ability of voters of holding corrupt politicians accountable, and (b) given institutional setups may be more effective in constraining corrupt behavior by those in power. However, competing arguments are presented about how and in which direction different institutional characteristics bring about these effects (Kunicová, 2006).

One of the factors discussed in the literature refers to executive-legislative relations, more specifically to the effect of presidentialist and parliamentarist forms of government. This theoretical debate is full of controversies. Theoretical models suggest that Presidentialism should be associated with less corruption, as it favors accountability by allowing voters to exercise direct control over the Executive. Additionally, its strong separation of powers would contribute to restricting opportunities for rent extraction in the government, by providing strengthened checks and balances between the Executive and the legislature (T. Persson & Tabellini, 2004). Similarly, it is argued that the increased number of veto-players under Presidentialism should reduce discretionary power and, consequently, corrupt behavior (Kunicová, 2006). At the same time, other authors argue that Presidential systems in practice often result in considerable concentration of power in the hands of the Executive, despite separation of powers, and therefore may be associated with more corruption. Together with fixed terms in office, this would in practice reduce oversight of the Executive, thus contributing to less accountability and more corruption (Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Finally, there are claims that higher centralization of power under Parliamentarism is conducive to stronger centralized, top-down accountability, and thus less corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2004).

Empirical evidence on these arguments are quite limited and inconclusive. Persson and Tabellini analyze a sample of 60 democracies, using various estimation techniques, and find that Presidentialism to be significantly associated with higher corruption (T. Persson & Tabellini, 2004). Blume et al. (2009) replicate their analyses on a larger sample, with 31

21 Their analysis makes a distinction between “good” and “bad” democracies and finds the opposite association between Presidentialism and corruption among good democracies. This classification of countries is based on the
additional countries, and with alternative classification of presidentialist and parliamentarist regimes, and find the negative effect of Presidentialism on corruption not to be robust to alternative measures of both the dependent and the independent variable. Gerring and Thacker (2004), on the other hand, find that Parliamentarism is significantly associated with less corruption, in a sample of over 100 democracies and partial democracies and controlling mainly for per capita income, energy dependence, democracy, Protestantism and legal origin.

A second institutional factor that is considered to affect corruption outcomes is the electoral system. A number of studies has examined how different electoral rules may affect the ability of voters of holding corrupt politicians accountable at the ballot (Kunicová, 2006; T. Persson, Tabellini, & Trebbi, 2003), and three main mechanisms are discussed. Firstly, different systems may create stronger or weaker accountability links between voters and incumbents. It is argued that plurality systems, where voters vote on specific candidates, favor electoral accountability, as there is a direct accountability link between incumbents and their constituency and reelection is more dependent on performance in office (Kunicová, 2006; T. Persson et al., 2003). In systems based on proportional representation (PR), on the other hand, voters vote on party lists determined by the parties, thus establishing a weaker accountability link between the voters and the individual candidates. This is most extreme in the case of closed lists, where the rank of elected candidates is decided internally by each party. In the case of open lists, differently, it may be argued that electoral accountability not necessarily weakened as with closed lists, because voters are also able to vote for specific candidates and influence the rank of elected candidates (Kunicová, 2006; T. Persson et al., 2003).

Secondly, different electoral systems may create different levels of political competition, thus affecting the range of alternatives that voters have to choose when they are dissatisfied with incumbents. These effects are hypothesized to work in the opposite direction as the previous arguments, however. In this debate, proportional representation is believed to increase political competition due to reduced entry barriers to new parties and candidates, especially by inducing larger district magnitude, which in turn should contribute to electoral accountability by offering voters more options of honest candidates (Kunicová, 2006; T. Persson et al., 2003).
Thirdly, electoral rules, by affecting the level of competition, impact the incentives of competitors and voters to monitor the behavior of incumbents, and thus indirectly affect the amount of information that voters may have at their disposal about how incumbents have behaved in office. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005) propose this line of thought, arguing that increased political competition may also have a negative effect on electoral accountability: in a two-party system, the opposition has more incentive to expose corruption by the incumbents because access to power depends on defeating them; under a higher number of parties, on the other hand, the chances of each individual party coming to power on its own is reduced, and the perspective of forming coalitions with the incumbent in the future may limit the incentives of exposing corrupt behavior.

The empirical evidence for the effect of different electoral rules on corruption do not offer clear-cut answers on which system is most advantageous for controlling corruption. Persson et al. (2003) test the effect of certain electoral rules on corruption on a sample of 80 democracies–classified according to Freedom House’s ratings–, both in cross-section and panel analyses, and find that voting on individual ballots (such as in plurality systems) and larger district magnitude are robustly associated with lower corruption. Blume et al. (2009) confirm these findings in their extended analysis. However, these features are not usually implemented together: plurality systems are often coupled with low-magnitude districts, and PR is mostly combined with larger district magnitude. Therefore, comprehensive electoral reforms could have counteracting effects on corruption, depending on how these characteristics are designed (T. Persson et al., 2003). Moreover, there could be interaction effects across different characteristics of electoral systems that should be explored further (Kunicová, 2006).

Finally, the literature also considers the effect of federalism on corruption outcomes. Federalism has been argued to affect corruption mainly through the effects of decentralized government, but there are claims that it may contribute to either increased and reduced corruption (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2009; Treisman, 2000)22. This controversy is present in discussions on how federalism impacts the structure of public service provision. If different levels of government have some kind of monopoly over the provision of particular or

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22 There is another stream in the literature that looks specifically at the effects of fiscal and administrative decentralization on corruption, but this analysis differs somewhat from the one on federalism (see Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006 for a review).
complementary services, this may lead to excessive bribing by officials across those levels; if there is competition in the provision of services, on the other hand, this may drive bribery down (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Moreover, sub-national governments could be more prone to corruption due to limited control by centralized enforcement agencies and increased pressure from local interest groups (Kunicová, 2006; Lessmann & Markwardt, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Treisman, 2000). At the same time, however, there are claims that corruption may be lower in federal structures, as sub-national governments can be better monitored and held accountable from below due to more proximity to local constituencies (Gerring & Thacker, 2004).

The empirical evidence has so far failed to clarify these controversies. Goldsmith (1999) and Treisman (2000) tests both hypotheses and finds evidence that federalism is significantly associated with more corruption. However, a later replication of these tests by Treisman (2007) in a larger sample no longer finds a statistically significant relationship. Gerring and Thacker (2004) apply the opposite concept of unitarism—conceptualized as a combination of non-federalism and unicameralism—and find it to be significantly associated with lower corruption. Adsera et al. (2003), on the other hand, find federalism to significantly reduce corruption. Finally, Bohara et al. (2004) also include federalism in their analysis, but find no significant relationship with the corruption indicator.

A note on mutual causality

As the several hypotheses and theoretical formulations discussed above illustrate, the relationship between democratization is one of high complexity. One main issue of concern in this literature is, naturally, if causality runs both ways between these two phenomena. In fact, there are several claims that corruption has detrimental effects on democracy. Johnston argues that competitive political processes can be undermined by corruption (2005, p. 28), and other authors mention corruption as one of the biggest obstacles and threats to democratic consolidation (Diamond et al., 1999, p. 1; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, p. 86). Mungiu-Pippidi highlights how corruption, in the form of clientelism and patronage, “subverts democracy” (2011, p. 12). As Warren puts it, “corruption […] breaks the link between collective decision-making and people’s powers to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy” (2004, p. 328). In essence, “Corruption […] violates norms of openness and equality that would seem to be central to democracy” (Sandholtz &
Koetzle, 2000, p. 31). The literature on consequences of corruption also points to its detrimental effects on democratic legitimacy (Andvig et al., 2001; Seligson, 2002).

This issue has, indeed, important methodological implications for the empirical analysis of the effect of democratization on corruption, especially in the case of the numerous quantitative analyses that have been conducted, as their results may be biased if the danger of reverse causality is not taken into account. For this reason, many researchers have made use of different strategies to minimize this problem.

Pellegata (2012), for instance, argues in favour of a concept of democracy based on electoral competition only, arguing that indicators based on this narrower concept, in contrast to more substantial notions of democracy, limit the potential for endogeneity when examining the effect of democratization on corruption. However, this rationale is questionable, if we take into consideration that corrupt practices such as vote-buying and clientelism are likely to affect the electoral dimension of democracy as well.

Other authors have relied on statistical techniques such as the use of lagged measures of democracy (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008; Treisman, 2007) or estimation with instrumental variables to circumvent the issue of reverse causality. However, in particular the identification of good instruments\(^{23}\) for democratic institutions, required for the latter type of analysis, is very challenging, as highlighted by Treisman (Treisman, 2007). Kalenborn and Lessmann (Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2012), for instance, use latitude and dummy variables for Europe and Central Asia and Scandinavian legal origin as instruments for democracy, but their choice of instruments is not grounded in detail. Rock (2007) also uses latitude and share of Protestant population as instrumental variables for democracy. There are issues particularly with Protestantism, which has been pointed by the literature as having an independent effect on corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013; Treisman, 2000, 2007). Kolstad and Wiig (2011) similarly employ instrumental variable analysis in their estimation of the effect of democracy on corruption, but devise their instrument for democracy based on the democratic peace thesis, i.e. an indicator of whether a country has been at war with another democracy between 1946 and 2009. However, they do not test for the non-linear effects that have been found in other studies.

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\(^{23}\) Instruments are variables that are reasonably correlated to the endogenous independent variable in question, but arguably do not affect the dependent variable in any plausible way (Treisman, 2007).
These brief remarks on the complexity of the causal links between democratization and corruption aim to stress that, although the extensive comparative literature on this subject has contributed much to advance our knowledge on the issue, there are still no absolute fool proof strategies to examine this question empirically. The reliance on aggregated indicators of democratization and lack of clarity concerning how it should be conceptualized in the scope of this relationship are issues that further aggravate this problem, and that have until now been only very superficially touched upon in the relevant literature. The next section discusses in more detail some of the conceptual gaps that remain in the literature on democratization and corruption.

**Democratization and corruption: conceptual issues**

Both democratization, or democracy, and corruption are relatively contested concepts. The respective academic literature on each of these topics includes extensive conceptual debates, and current definitions are from being consensual. In the case of democracy, for instance, definitions vary along a wide spectrum of attributes that are considered necessary to characterize a regime as democratic. A minimalist definition of democracy, for instance, requires only the selection of rulers by competitive elections (Przeworski, 1996); other less thin procedural conceptions establish additional criteria, such as the existence of full suffrage and minimal civil liberties (Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Coppedge, 2005; Dahl, 1971). At the same time, there are more substantive conceptions of democracy that refer not only to procedures, but also to effective social and political outcomes of democratic regimes. Recent discussions in this direction have articulated the concept of quality of democracy, which considers to what extent the “goals” of an ideal democracy—e.g. popular sovereignty, political equality—are achieved in specific democratic regimes (Diamond & Morlino, 2005). In the case of corruption, similarly, numerous issues regarding the scope of the concept—e.g. public vs. private sector corruption, legal vs. illegal corruption, universal vs. culture-specific concepts etc.—continue to be under debate.

Despite such controversies, it is interesting to notice that existing scholarly work on the relationship between democratization and corruption rarely engages in a clear conceptual

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24 Some useful summaries of conceptual approaches to corruption can be found in Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002), Lancaster and Montinola (1997) and Philp (2002). A comprehensive discussion on corruption and related conceptual issues is also presented in the first section of the report.
discussion of either. Different studies employ distinct definitions and, at times, conceptualizations of democratization and corruption are implicit at best. In the case of democratization, only a handful of studies deliberately discuss the conceptual approach taken and which indicators most adequately correspond to the particular concept applied (Bohara et al., 2004; Pellegata, 2012; Rock, 2007; Saha, 2008). A large part of existing research appears to be more driven by data availability on aggregate indicators of democracy than by conceptual clarity and concerns with validity. Therefore, some questions remain regarding appropriate definitional and empirical approaches for this concept when studying this relationship.

Given that democracy is still an “essentially contested concept” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Coppedge, 2005) and a single, consistent definition is unlikely to emerge, what alternatives are available for future research in order to minimize some of the conceptual gaps and inconsistencies that previous research has shown? A strategy that still has been little used is to study the effect of democratization on corruption in a more disaggregated manner (Bohara et al., 2004; Lederman et al., 2005; Saha, 2008). The review of the literature presented in the previous section shows numerous theoretical arguments for the effect of democratization on corruption, which often allude to a multidimensional view of democratization. An overview of the causal mechanisms that are discussed can be enlightening as to which dimensions have so far been considered as plausibly affecting corruption outcomes in a political system.

Part of the authors emphasizes the electoral competition component of democratization, i.e. the introduction of free and fair competitive elections. This dimension is discussed as having a negative effect of corruption through two main mechanisms: a) by empowering voters to sanction corrupt politicians in the next elections; and b) by motivating the opposition to expose corrupt behaviour by their competitors. There is a controversy, though, regarding the effect of electoral competition on corruption, as some authors also argue that it may at the

25 Freedom House’s Freedom Index and Polity IV’s indicator of democracy are among the most commonly used measures of democracy, and often used as alternative indicators or combined into a single measure in specific studies, even though they lie on distinct conceptions of democracy. While Polity IV measures institutionalized democracy according to the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraint on Chief Executive and competitiveness of political participation (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), Freedom House’s measure is more comprehensive and includes a civil liberties dimension. An additional problem with Freedom House’s indicator that is virtually ignored in most studies is that its Political Rights dimension includes a component called Functioning of Government, which explicitly considers the absence of corruption as a sub-indicator (http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/checklist-questions-and-guidelines). For a critical assessment of different democracy measures, see Munck and Verkuilen (2002).
same time create certain incentives for corruption, or only allow new rent-seekers to compete for state resources.

Other claims highlight the role of *democratic freedoms* of information, association and expression, also linked to the emergence of a free press, in contributing to the monitoring of governments by the citizenry and the consequent reduction of corruption in society. Furthermore, the importance of *institutional mechanisms of control* to put a check on the government is discussed. Finally, a *normative dimension* of democratization is also included in this debate, with regards to the consolidation of democratic norms that crystallize the belief among the citizenry that corruption is antithetical to democracy and the common interest.

Taking all of these mechanisms into consideration, one can see that a minimalist concept of democratization, reduced only to the electoral dimension, would be insufficient to account for its potential effect on corruption, the more so because the issue whether electoral competition ultimately contributes to an increase or a decrease in corruption is not fully settled in the literature. At the same time, a too encompassing understanding of democratization might blur the distinctions between cause and outcome, to the extent that it might assume the very absence of corruption. Thus establishing a consistent framework that can account for all the proposed mechanisms and at the same time still allow for a causal nexus between democratization and corruption is not an easy task. Given this difficulty, a disaggregated approach to this question, focusing on how specific dimensions of democratization affect corruption, may offer an advantageous alternative to better disentangle the different causal pathways and the potentially contradictory effects of some of these dimensions.

Another strategy to conceptualize the relationship between democratization and corruption in a more consistent way, but at the same time bringing together these hypothesized causal paths into a clearer structure, could draw on a framework of dimensions of accountability, as a kind of “common denominator” of the theoretical explanations offered in the literature. Several authors in the literature on democratization and corruption implicitly or explicitly talk about dimensions of accountability when describing the theoretical foundations of their analysis (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Lederman et al., 2005).

26 Saha (2008), for instance, tests for the linear effect of an indicator of “narrow” democracy, operationalized with Freedom House’s Political Rights index, and finds it to be significantly positively associated with corruption, i.e. stronger political rights are associated with higher corruption.

27 See note 25.

28 The dimensions of vertical and horizontal accountability are widely referred to in the literature on democracy and accountability. For a more detailed discussion on these dimensions, see O’Donnell (1994, 1999), Schedler et al. (1999), Mainwaring and Welna (2003) and Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006).
Accountability\textsuperscript{29} has in fact been highlighted by some authors as being one of democracy’s most important components (Schmitter, 2007) and a core feature of representative democracy (Morlino, 2007, p. 130). Such an approach would interpret the theoretical claims on the effect of democratization on corruption as being essentially associated with the consolidation of vertical and horizontal accountability, or factors enabling this consolidation, such as democratic freedoms and the crystallization of democratic norms.

Naturally, studying the link between democratization and corruption involves certain assumptions regarding the conceptualization of dependent variable, which faces challenges of its own. As mentioned earlier, a somewhat standard definition of corruption in the literature is based on a certain type of behaviour, usually defined as the misuse or abuse of public power for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Treisman, 2000). This conceptualization is commonly associated with theoretical frameworks that take into account the agency relationship between voters and elected officials, whereby the former, in the role of principal, entrust the latter, as agents, with power to make decisions on behalf of their interests, in order to achieve a set of preferred outcomes determined by the principal (Kitschelt et al., 2009; Lancaster & Montinola, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Corruption thus constitutes a violation of the obligation taken by the agent to act according to the principal’s interests.

More recent scholarly work has criticized this predominant approach and the associated definition of corruption, claiming that it is empty of normative standards. This line of research has argued for a normative “core” to understand corruption, associated with the violation of principles of impartiality and universalism in the exercise of power and the allocation of public resources, in order to benefit private interests (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Rothstein, 2011). In connection with this idea, they have also analysed corruption from a societal perspective and discussed how societies where corruption is widespread represent a certain type of social order and governance regime founded on particularistic values, instead of individualistic and universalistic ones (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Rothstein, 2011). Mungiu-Pippidi articulates this view in a taxonomy of governance regimes, where particularistic regimes are characterized by unequal distribution of power, a state that is not autonomous of private interests, incomplete separation between public and private spheres, and weak accountability and rule of law (2011, p. 12).

\textsuperscript{29} Accountability implies “[…]the ability to ensure that public officials are answerable for their behavior – forced to justify and inform the citizenry about their decisions and possibly eventually be sanctioned for them” (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz 2006, p.5).
Considering the different conceptual and theoretical approaches for the understanding of democratization and of corruption, it is thus crucial to assess the compatibility of the different approaches on the dependent and the independent variables. As mentioned above, very broad notions of democracy might assume the absence of corruption and create obstacles for causal inference. The concept of quality of democracy (Diamond & Morlino, 2005), for instance, presupposes a regime where principles of equality and the rule of law are upheld, which would be conceptually incompatible with the idea of corruption as a governance regime (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Rothstein, 2011). A relevant discussion to this effect is the one relating democracy with access to power, in contrast to the exercise of power, which has been associated with concepts such as quality of democracy (Mazzuca, 2010) and quality of government (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In this dichotomy, corruption would then pertain to the sphere of how power is exercised. This is also a conceptual approach that may be useful to help to settle some of the definitional frontiers between democracy and corruption. Whether a concept of democracy should indeed exclude any consideration on how power is exercised is debatable, but these issues must certainly be more rigorously considered and discussed in future research on democratization and corruption.

Concluding remarks

This paper has sought to demonstrate that the literature on democratization and corruption offers insights on a complex relationship, where multiple hypotheses and causal pathways for an effect of the former on the latter are discussed. Based on existing research, some open questions remain regarding this relationship.

The latest evidence points to a non-linear effect of democratization on corruption, whereby corruption appears to increase in the short to medium term after a democratic transition and a fall in corruption levels should be observed only in the long term. This emphasizes a temporal aspect relevant to this relationship, namely that the consolidation of certain dimensions of democratization may take a long time, thus affecting the time span in which their effects on corruption should materialize. However, the specific mechanisms by which such an effect would take place are still unclear. A number of theoretical propositions have been put forth, and some of them include arguments about potential contradictory effects of different dimensions of democratization on corruption, but conclusive evidence to support or reject
them are still lacking. Future studies may need to explore cases in more detail in order to shed further light on the workings of this relationship.

Another point of concern for the empirical analysis of this relationship is the matter of endogeneity, due to a likely feedback effect of corruption on democratization. This problem is still poorly addressed in the literature, and remains ignored in some of the studies surveyed. There are analyses that have attempted to address this problem through the employment of statistical techniques, but some of the solutions offered are not fully convincing, so that future research should also seek to advance in this respect, in order to generate more reliable results.

Finally, certain conceptual gaps have been identified in the literature. Most studies lack detailed discussions on the conceptualization of democratization and corruption, which creates considerable problems regarding the validity of indicators employed to measure these variables. Moreover, in the particular case of democratization and corruption, concepts may overlap depending on how these two phenomena are conceptualized, so that a research agenda for the future should definitely engage with these issues. A few possible strategies toward advancing on this front were proposed, such as adopting a more disaggregated approach to democracy through its multiple dimensions, focusing on the concept of accountability as a central element in explaining the effect of democratization on corruption, or examining this relationship from the conceptual lens of a distinction between access to and exercise of power. These approaches could also be further articulated and pursued in future research endeavours.

In sum, the relationship between democracy and corruption still offers much fertile ground for further developments in the understanding of corruption and its causes and potential remedies. The analysis of the issues mentioned above certainly implies empirical challenges in the documentation of better indicators, but at the same time there is room for great innovation beyond existing indicators of democracy and corruption. Hopefully efforts in this direction will contribute to generating new insights for better-targeted and more effective anti-corruption policies in the future.
References


Project profile

ANTICORRP is a large-scale research project funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme. The full name of the project is “Anti-corruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption”. The project started in March 2012 and will last for five years. The research is conducted by 21 research groups in sixteen countries.

The fundamental purpose of ANTICORRP is to investigate and explain the factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anti-corruption policies and impartial government institutions. A central issue is how policy responses can be tailored to deal effectively with various forms of corruption. Through this approach ANTICORRP seeks to advance the knowledge on how corruption can be curbed in Europe and elsewhere. Special emphasis is laid on the agency of different state and non-state actors to contribute to building good governance.

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