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Control of Corruption During the Post-Conflict:

Promoting Good Governance in Colombia

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Abstract[1]

This research is focused on the Colombian Government's flagship post-conflict and state-building policy from 2009 to 2015, known as the "Consolidation Policy". The Government's policy aimed to transform the governance in post-conflict regions from a social order functional to the armed conflict to such a social order that would promote good governance and inclusive governmental institutions. The analysis sheds light on the limitations and achievements of the policy on the control of corruption and examines the extent to which it shaped the governance order of post-conflict regions in the short term using a mixed methods approach including a differences-in-differences estimation and semi-structured interviews.

The analysis is based in the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption, which identifies policy-actionable variables that promote good governance and the control of corruption. This theory was operationalized in the context of post-conflict Colombia. This research determined the changes produced by the Government policy on the control of corruption by comparing control and intervention municipalities. The analysis revealed a mixed effect on the control of corruption where the intervention occurred. The results showed that the Consolidation Policy was associated with more civil society collective actions, at least in a group of municipalities, and an increase in local government accountability to citizens. On the contrary, there seems to be no association of the policy with increments in local government procurement transparency, or disciplinary sanctions to local civil servants by the Office of the Inspector General, one of the state control agencies

The research identifies the main issues that limited the Consolidation Policy's mixed effect on the control of corruption. First, instead of a quick-impact approach, this research recommends a gradualist, long-term approach that combines insecurity reduction and empowering citizen group's to keep corruption in check. Second, given the limitations of the Colombian State to regulate governance in conflict affected areas, civil society should be a central partner in the initiatives of good governance promotion.

Keywords: Colombia, post-conflict, control of corruption, good governance, Consolidation Policy, differences in differences, corruption, conflict.

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List of Abbreviations

CELI	Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CINEP	Center for Research and Popular Education
CP	Consolidation Policy
DD	Differences in differences
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GOC	Government of Colombia
USAID	United Stated Agency for International Development

1. Introduction

In 2016, the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement ending five decades of armed confrontation that resulted in 260,000 murdered and seven million internally displaced people (GOC and FARC, 2016). The peace agreement's objective is to produce lasting peace by addressing the conditions which have maintained the armed political conflict for five decades. Such lasting peace involves strengthening institutions so that citizens' rights can be promoted effectively and credibly, and so that conflicts can be dealt with without violence. The objective, in the words of one of the peace agreement architects, is "to impose a logic of inclusion and integration, based on a new alliance between state and communities to build institutions jointly. Institutions, understood not only as state presence, but the establishment of norms and practices that regulate public life and produce wellbeing" (Jaramillo, 2014). To put it in other words, the peace process aims to produce a change in the formal and informal rules that determine who gets what in the regions that have been affected by the conflict.

This paper will examine the limitations and achievements of a statebuilding policy that tried to generate a transition of governance in conflict-affected regions. From 2009 to 2015, the Colombian government implemented the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial, or Consolidation Policy - CP). The Consolidation Policy (CP) aimed to transition from a social order functional to the armed conflict to such an order that would facilitate social interaction and produce inclusive governmental institutions. The CP was "a coordinated, progressive and irreversible process, through which the state's efforts are articulated to ensure a sustainable environment of security and peace that allows the strengthening of democratic institutions, for the benefit of the free exercise of citizens' rights and the generation of conditions for their human development" (Presidencia de la República, 2009). This statebuilding effort was based on the premise that the armed conflict and illegal economies are inseparable from the weak-state presence (Consolidación Colombia, 2014). Particularly, the policy designers understood the concept of consolidation as three parallel objectives: to extend institutional presence to the conflict-affected zones, to foster citizen organization and good governance, and to improve regional economic development.

As a way to bolster the Colombian Government effort, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) implemented the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) from 2011 to 2017. In coordination with the Colombian government, USAID's program was a complement to the CP implemented in 33 of 51 municipalities where the Colombian government intervened. From 2011 to 2017, in those 33 municipalities, a total contribution of $577 million USD was spent 1,606 development projects[1]. The Colombian public entities contributed with 45 per cent, USAID 30 per cent, local communities with 11 per cent, the private sector 10 per cent, and 4 per cent others[2].

This research follows the theoretical perspective, according to which, the path to good governance is possible when the civil society has instruments to check the state. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) propose that transitions to inclusive political institutions, consisting of a

1 This figure captures only the projects in which USAID was involved. Data obtained from USAID (2018).

2 The contribution could be in-kind or cash.

state with capacity and a broad distribution of political power (instead of monopoly of power), can happen if the mobilization of a "broad coalition" in society attains power. The scholars underscore that the origin of such a "broad coalition" lies in the social norms and informal institutions which facilitated not only the formation of a capable state, but also led to a robust civil society capable to discipline the state (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2016). In parallel with this theoretical perspective that emphasizes the role of norms in society, Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston (2017) claim that human agency, limited by structural factors (such as the geography or war), has a "critical role" in the transitions towards good governance and control of corruption. Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston underscore that transitions to goof governance might occur when a society, "guided by the principles of openness, effective government, and accountability" understands that it has a stake in a government that can perform basic tasks "effectively and credibly."

The concept of inclusive political institutions by Acemoglu and Robinson has been criticized for being too broad, which complicates identifying a clear metric to track governance changes (Fukuyama, 2012). This is particularly troubling for evaluating changes in governance, as it is the purpose of this research. However, Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) made a contribution with the Index of Public Integrity. Following the notion that human action has a critical role in transitions to good governance, the Index of Public Integrity assesses those policy actionable mechanisms that affect the capacity of a society to control corruption. The Index of Public Integrity is based on the idea that a governance regime is "a set of formal and informal rules determining who gets what" in regard to public resource allocations. Countries, or in this research municipalities, can be placed in a continuum in the exchanges between society and the state, in which at one end is ethical universalism, and at the other, particularism (Mungiu Pippidi, 2006). Following these ideas, control of corruption can be defined as a specific position in such continuum, "determined by the resources available for spoiling by the government and its clients and the constraints that the rest of the society can inflict to prevent such an occurrence. The outcome of the balance between opportunities (…) and constraints is equilibrium in social allocation that oscillates between particularism and universalism in government transactions" (Mungiu Pippidi and Dadašov, 2016).

This research assesses the extent to which the joint statebuilding effort of USAID and the Colombian government had an effect improving the control of corruption using a contextualized version of the Index of Public Integrity in the Colombian post-conflict setting. The main question of this document is: to what extent did the Consolidation Policy (CP) affected the control of corruption? The objective of the research is to assess to what extent the presence of the CP, aided by USAID, improved the control of corruption at the municipal level. To answer this, a multi-method approach is proposed. First, corruption opportunities and corruption constrains, the two components of the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption, are operationalized. Then, the document analyses whether the consolidation policy was associated with possible improvements in the control of corruption through an econometric analysis of "differences-in-differences". Also, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with policy designers, implementers, scholars and community leaders to complement the quantitative analysis. The unit of analysis are the municipalities.

Before continuing, it is important to note the temporal and spatial dimensions of the research. In regard to the temporal dimension, this paper shows short-term results of the Consolidation Policy. It is known that substantive changes on governance may take more time. However, in post-conflict environments the citizens pressure the state to show the peace dividends quickly. Such dividends can legitimize peace and prevent further violence (Sacks and Larizza, 2012). The joint effort by the Colombian government and USAID was conceived to have a quick impact to gain the trust of the population in conflict-affected regions. In light thereof, this analysis will shed light on those components of the control of corruption which were most susceptible to change in a relatively short period of time. In regard to the spatial dimension, the relationship between the armed conflict and corruption is expressed at the subnational level, particularly the municipality.

This text is organized as follows. The section two presents the literature connecting corruption, conflict and statebuilding. The third describes the context of corruption in Colombia and its link to the armed conflict. Next, the text presents theoretical framework, which includes the Consolidation Policy, its theory of change and the research hypotheses. The fourth section describes the methodological strategy and data. This is followed by an analysis of the research results and limitations. Finally, the conclusion and recommendations are presented.

2. Literature review: linking control of corruption, conflict and statebuilding

a. Control of corruption as an equilibrium of governance

Some early and still widely used definitions understand corruption as the "deviation from the norm" (Scott, 1972) or "the abuse of power for private gain" (Nye, 1967). These definitions presume a separation between private and public spheres and further assume an impersonal modern relationship between state and society. However, from a global as well as a historical perspective, the Weberian modern nation-state is the exception rather than the rule, especially in post-conflict states (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Risse, 2011).

This research follows the argument that it is more useful to focus on the regime of governance, or "the set of formal and informal rules determining how public goods are distributed in a given society", according to Mungiu-Pippidi (2006), to study corruption. The scholar underscores that a regime of governance can be characterized as corrupt when a majority of the allocation of public resources between society and the state are more particularistic than universalistic. While particularism mirrors a governance regime characterized by corrupt relations between society and state, monopolistic power concentration, and no public-private spheres division; universalism is the opposite, mirroring a governance regime in which the relations between state and citizens are impartial, power is relatively equally distributed and there is a separation of public and private spheres.

Considering the multiple ways in which corruption affects regimes of governance, the literature has developed two main approaches: the micro-theoretical and macro-empirical approaches (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2016). The micro-theoretical perspective proposes that corruption should be approached as a principal-agent problem. The self-interested agents (the public officials) abuse their entrusted power given by the principal (the government), who fails to control such abuse (Klitgaard, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Bardhan, 1997a). Nevertheless, the micro-theoretical approach has been criticized for largely ignoring the context in which corrupt relations take place (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). On the other theoretical line lies the macro-empirical models which differ from the micro-empirical model in that the level of analysis is not the individual, but rather the structural and policy factors at the country level (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2016). This literature has increasingly acknowledged the crucial but complex role of inclusive political institutions to produce sustained economic prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

In an attempt to bridge both macro-empirical and micro-theoretical lines, Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2016) propose a model that identifies the most robust and policy-actionable elements that are causally related to the control of corruption. According to these scholars, the Control of Corruption Equilibrium Model can be understood as:

Control of Corruption =
Opportunities (material resources + power discretion) – Constraints (legal + normative)

The concept of opportunities for corruption is divided between the material resources and discretionary power resources. Material resources, such as natural resources, public sector jobs, external aid, subsidies, and any other public resources available for discretionary distribution that can be turned into spoils. Researchers have determined the positive correlation between corruption and natural resources and the lack of budget transparency (Tanzi, 1998; Teixeira et al., 2015). Similarly, discretionary power resources come from privileged access under power arrangements (status groups, negative social capital networks, social orders), such as red tape and economic regulation (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000). In contrast, corruption constraints are divided between legal and normative. Legal constraints refer to an autonomous and effective judiciary. Judicial independence and press freedom are important variables in this respect (Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013). The normative constraints relate to the social norms that back universalism. Instead of citizens merely conforming to the particularistic rules, what actually reduces corruption is an autonomous and critical population capable of collective action (Norris and Zinnbauer 2002; Grimes 2013). It is important to note that while the Equilibrium Model is conditioned by structural factors of a country, such as development level, war or geography, the model itself can be affected by human agency. Thus, it provides a framework to analyze the effects of anticorruption policy interventions that sought to change the informal and formal rules of governance that assign who gets what. This research applies the Equilibrium Model of Corruption Control in the context of post-conflict Colombia to assess the Consolidation Policy.

b. Conflict and corruption

From an academic perspective, the literature is divided into two theoretical lines that suggest a double direction of causality: corruption fueling conflict and corruption fueling a stable political order (O'Donnell, 2008; Le Billion, 2003). The corruption fueling conflict approach suggests that a political regime that does not legitimize the private use of public funds can lead to violence. Le Billion (2003) shows three mechanisms in this relation. First, corruption can increase the grievances that lead to a violent change in a political regime's leadership (Mauro, 1995). Second, the possibility to control the spoils that result from capturing the state can produce greedily-motivated violent actions to change the regime. Lastly, when legislative, electoral or judicial processes are flawed and corrupt, opposing political groups can resort to violence to reach their desired results.

In contrast to this approach, the second theoretical line argues that corruption can produce political stability and economic growth. In essence, it suggests that corruption facilitates order because rulers can co-opt the "governance spoilers" by satisfying their grievances or greedy motivations to overturn the regime (O'Donnell, 2008; Le Billion, 2003). Other authors have pointed to the ability of the ruling party to organize and give material incentives for compliance, often corruptly (Scott, 1972). In a similar vein, and at the expense of economic inefficiency, Bardhan (1997b) notes that sharing spoils from public office is tolerated as long as it keeps the discontent under control. However, O'Donnell (2008) questions whether the peace spoilers and governance spoilers are the same, and whether a regime of governance based on patronage and corruption can sustain itself in the long term.

In an effort to bridge the debate, some authors propose that the changes in the patterns of corruption determine whether corruption causes order or conflict. Le Billion (2003) and Zaum (2013), argue that corruption is "endogenous" of the wider organization of power in society. In other words, corruption is a central feature in the logic of a political system. Corruption can be a force that powerfully provides stability. In such a case, the acceptance of the

legitimacy of the ruler does not mirror the Weberian rules of state impartiality, but it rests on sectional targeted benefits rooted in informal codes associated with reciprocity ties within a particular network (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). However, these types of regimes are unstable and vulnerable. Considering that the legitimacy of a regime is closely related to the redistribution of resources, conflicts arise when internal or external shocks modify the corrupt patterns in which the elite distributes such resources to its clientele (Le Billion, 2003; Zaum, 2013). In turn, the elite can act violently to resist such changes to keep their position and maintain the status quo. These shocks may include statebuilding, the delegitimization of the authoritarian rule, or democracy.

c. Statebuilding and corruption

According to Paris and Sisk (2009), statebuilding can be defined as a "particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions." The process of statebuilding is filled with contradictions and dilemmas, particularly related to corruption. These dilemmas prove hard to solve, and some scholars call for a "rethink" of statebuilding interventions and more research on its impacts (Paris and Sisk, 2009). The issue of corruption reflects the political essence of statebuilding and the problematic trade-off posed to the international community between stability and corruption.

Informed by the theoretical relationship between conflict and corruption, Cheng and Zaum (2012) note that in post-conflict countries whose hostilities were settled through a peace agreement, corruption can produce short-term stability, or a "purchase of peace effect". The effect of buying the "peace spoilers" disincentivizes violence between opposing factions. However, in the long term, this "purchase of peace effect" comes at the cost of undermining the legitimacy of the post-war political institutions that statebuilding agencies promote. Those statebuilding agencies are tempted to prioritize stability and security over governance reforms, especially if, as a result of institutional changes such as removing the patrimonial regime, the risk of destabilizing the country increases (Zürcher and Barnett, 2008). Consequently, "purchasing the peace" in statebuilding increases the resilience against violence, but intentionally and/or accidentally creates more obstacles for a substantial transition of governance because it allows the institutionalization of corrupt practices (Zaum, 2013). As Schneckener (2011) concisely concludes: the actual effect of statebuilding could be "not the establishment of self-sustaining and viable state structures, but an open-ended international involvement (…), which often prove to be instrumental for the status quo interests of local elites and, therefore, lead to the unintentional stabilization of existing power structures."

For practitioners, there is no unified approach on how to address corruption in statebuilding (O'Donnell, 2008). At a conceptual level, despite having the same goal of increasing the Weberian character of the state, policy makers disagree on the means to achieve this. While some frame the problem as state fragility due to lack of capacity and power, others contrarily propose that the state itself is the problem because of its abusive and predatory power (O'Donnell, 2008). Although the state might seem weak, fragile and underfunded from an outside perspective, locals might perceive the state as the most powerful player (O'Donnell, 2008).

These opposing views have different policy implications. Since it is very difficult to produce the demand for institutions from the outside, external efforts should focus on dimensions of stateness that can be manipulated and built externally, such as public administration and institutional design. (Fukuyama, 2004). However, despite the fact that the "mantra of modernization policy" has produced many rational-legal administration structures in developing countries, patronage and corruption continues to be the norm in those societies (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015).

3. Corruption and conflict in Colombia: Moguls in the core and oligarchs in the periphery

Johnston (2005) distinguishes four typologies of corruption according to the extent to which power is formally institutionalized and distributed among a society. For post-conflict Colombia, two of these typologies are relevant: the "official mogul" and "oligarchs". Both concepts are differentiated according to the number of powerful corrupt actors, and the degree of concentration or competition over the control of the state and corrupt resources. "Official mogul" political systems are characterized by a small ruling elite that has captured the state and its bureaucracy, and dominates public life with a long-term vision. With weak institutions, the ruling elite's power rests on regular and predictable patron-client interactions. Such type of regime has been also called "developmental neo-patrimonialism" because of its coexistence with economic growth and political stability over prolonged periods of time (Kelsall and Booth, 2010). On the other hand, the "oligarchs' corruption" is also characterized by weak institutions but also a fragmented political elite that competes for power and control over resources, which increases the risk violence compared to "official mogul" regime type. These competing elites tend to produce both politically and economically insecure and uncertain environments, and as a result, fewer and less-stable patronage networks.

This section uses the concepts of official mogul and oligarchs, proposed by Johnston (2005), to describe how corruption fuels the armed conflict in Colombia. Colombia is geographically divided between core and periphery (Robinson, 2016). In the core, the policy outcomes and political institutions tend to be more inclusive. On the contrary, in the periphery the elites tend to be more extractive. This results in poverty, political violence and misery concentrated in the periphery. This is attributed to the way in which the elites of the periphery and the core relate, which is mediated by patronage, corruption, and extractivism. Scholars agree that the interaction of national and subnational elites explains the weakness of the state institutions, poor responsiveness and fragile production of public goods in the Colombian periphery (Villegas, 2016; López, 2016; Gutiérrez, 2014).

While the elites in the core receive votes from the elites in the periphery, in exchange, the elites in the periphery are delegated to control the local government and the exploitation of local resources (Gutiérrez, 2014). This exchange produces a suboptimal balance between the political regime and the Colombian State, which is functional to the elites, but dysfunctional for the rest of the citizens, especially to those in the periphery. As a consequence, the construction of impartial institutions, in the Weberian sense, tends to be concentrated in the core of Colombia, but scant in the periphery (Robinson, 2016). Given this distribution of power, well-intentioned attempts to build impartial institutions in the periphery, such as the statebuilding program that this research studies, must first go through a complex network of core and periphery elites' patronage which tend to dilute any transformative potential. The CP, as will be explained further below, politicized in this way.

How do the armed insurgencies and armed conflict fit in this framework? In the periphery of Colombia, from the mid-20th century onwards, the insurgencies started to replace or fill the absence of weak public institutions, generating an institutional relationship between the Colombian State and citizens functional to the armed conflict. This can be described as oligarchic-type corruption using Johnston's terminology. As the insurgencies' economic, social and political influence grew, they became powerful enough to negotiate or co-opt the

peripheral elites, and thus local governments were captured or heavily influenced by the insurgencies. This institutional capture leaves the peripheral population subjected to the authoritarian order imposed by patronage and the discretionary power of local insurgencies.

Arjona (2008) evidences the ability of armed actors to co-opt public entities by making them work in the interests of an armed group. In some cases, there has also been an alignment between the interests of local political elites and armed groups that shape electoral results and their political decisions (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, 2013). Other authors show that the insurgencies' armed activity can be explained by the capture of public resources (Sánchez and Chacón, 2005). In conclusion, a perverse division of functions developed between the Colombian State and its illegal armed competitors in the periphery: the illegal armed groups provide the "hard functions" such as security, justice and taxation, while the State provides the "soft functions" such as social welfare, social goods and some public services (López, 2016).

4. Theoretical framework

This section presents the Consolidation Policy background, its implementation and its theory of change. Then, after a brief review of past studies about the Consolidation Policy, the research hypotheses are presented. Finally, the section concludes with the policy inputs.

a. Consolidation policy background

The National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (CP) is the result of a tradition of cooperation between the United States and Colombia (Tickner, 2014). Between 2000 and 2014, Colombia received approximately US$9.4 billion from the US Government, making Colombia one of the top-ten worldwide aid recipients (ibid). Before the mid-2000s the focus of cooperation was almost entirely for counternarcotics, particularly to combat coca production (ibid). However, the aid started to "Colombianize" when the Colombian government solicited the US officials to become more involved in the internal armed conflict. This lobbying paid off as the range of US aid expanded to combating the insurgency, increasing territorial control of the Colombian State, fostering the rule of law and promoting economic development (Tickner, 2014). While the cooperation activities increased their scope from military to institutional components, the resources coming from the US government declined, as shown in graph one. In 2007, a pilot program implemented an innovative approach to strengthen the presence of the government in guerrilla-dominated areas. With heavy US input, it was called the "Integral Consolidation Program of the Macarena." With this approach, once guerilla presence had been reduced in response to military action, quick impact projects would gain the trust of people, and state representatives would enter the territory with the aim of "consolidating the state presence" (Isacson, 2012). The national expansion of this pilot program was the Consolidation Policy (the joint effort between the Colombian Government and USAID), the focus of this investigation.

Graph 1. Millions of USD aid by type



Source: Own elaboration with data from Isacson (2014).

b. The phased logic of the Consolidation Policy

The CP was conceived as "a coordinated, progressive and irreversible process, through which the state efforts are articulated to ensure a sustainable environment of security and peace that allows the strengthening of democratic institutions, for the benefit of the free exercise of citizens' rights and the generation of conditions for their human development" (Presidencia de la República, 2009). The policy was implemented in areas where weak institutional state presence, illicit crops (mainly coca), human rights violations and insurgencies (mainly FARC), converged. The program was a mechanism to coordinate the provision of security by the military, police, and the government institutions providing social and economic development, justice and good governance. The CP originates at the central government level. In 2009, the Center for Coordination of Integrated Action (Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral) was the agency in charge of implementing the policy. Later in 2011, after reforms to emphasize the components of good governance, the implementing agency changed its name to the Special Administrative Unit for Territorial Consolidation (Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial). The design of the policy envisioned a phased and sequenced approach (Consolidación Colombia, 2014). The first phase, "Recovery", involved an intense military effort in municipalities with poor security. In municipalities selected for the "Recovery" phase, the armed forces carried out operations to expel guerrillas, disrupt their support and supply networks, and accompany coca eradication. In the second phase, "Transition", the intensity of the military effort was reduced and slowly replaced by the police, prosecutors and development workers conducting "quick impact" development projects, and holding community workshops to identify population needs and demands. These small but highly visible projects, carried out oftentimes by the community, would increase trust in government institutions. In the final phase, "Stabili-

zation", military effort would be at its lowest, and development activities would be in full bloom. The end result would be a region with "consolidated" state presence, with a civilian government providing services in a secure environment to citizens able to participate in the nation's politics and economy. The CP had three parallel components: to extend institutional presence to the conflict-affected zones, to foster citizen organization and good governance, and to improve regional economic development. Table one shows the policy objectives and activities.

Table 1. Program components and activities

Policy components	Activities
Strengthen institutional development	Improve accountability and strengthen the local government response, such as through training in planning, budgeting, procurement, project formulation and management.
Strengthen social development and good governance	Promote alliances between the community and the state, social capital and civil society development, training and support for Community Action Councils (JACs).
Catalyze economic development	Support for productive activities and agricultural value chains (technical assistance and training in farming, processing, and marketing).

Source: Núñez et al. (2016)

c. Research hypotheses and the theory of change

The academic research on the CP has primarily focused on implementation problems and impact of the counterinsurgency component on Consolidation Policy outcomes (Delgado 2015; Palou et al, 2011; Villegas and Espinosa, 2011; Isacson, 2012). However, the studies have not analyzed the theory of change of the policy regarding governance. While this study recognizes that the counterinsurgent component plays an important role in shaping the governance outcomes, it is also true that the Consolidation Policy wanted to produce lasting governance impact by promoting good governance, civil society and local government strengthening. These policy components have been less studied. Moreover, most research on the policy does not account for the amendments that the program had in 2011 and the support from USAID. Such changes sought to emphasize the good governance aspects, and the literature has not studied how these changes could have affected policy outcomes. In light thereof, this research tries to fill the knowledge gap in regard to the governance changes that the Consolidation Policy might have produced, particularly in the control of corruption.

Some scholars have noted the conceptual ambiguity in the causal process of the Consolidation Policy and the few explicit links between the policy interventions and the theories of governance transitions. Apart from this vagueness, a lack of clear indicators to measure progress in the governance transition has complicated the possibility of evaluating the policy (Kaplan, 2015; Villegas and Espinosa, 2011). Thus, this study derives the theory of change of the Consolidation Policy from interview data and policy documents, as others researchers did before (Kaplan, 2015; Villegas and Espinosa, 2011).

In its causal logic, the Consolidation Policy organizes and institutionalises the citizens' demands, which allow for a more capable and controlled local government to respond without the pressure from armed insurgencies. The synergy between civil society and a more capable state is translated to higher control of corruption, which leads to a consolidation of state presence. To the extent that the Consolidation Policy tried to change the informal and formal rules that assign who gets what, or governance, the policy can be studied under the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption. According to this theory, control of corruption can be fomented by increasing corruption constraints and decreasing corruption opportunities (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2016). The Consolidation Policy increased the corruption constraints through increasing the presence of state agencies that watch the local government ci-

vil servants. Also, the policy tried to strengthen the civil society organizations. In regard to the theoretical component of opportunities for corruption, the Consolidation Policy decreased the civil servants' discretionary power by promoting accountability, and greater transparency of the local government budget. Considering these ideas, this study tests these hypotheses:

Corruption Opportunities:

a. Discretionary power: The statebuilding policy is associated with an increase in accountability by the local government to local citizens, and therefore a decrease in the power discretion of state officials and their capabilities of acting against the common good.

b. Resources: The statebuilding policy is associated with an increase in budget transparency; the higher the budget transparency, specifically transparency in public procurement, the lower probability that the resources are spoiled.

Corruption Constraints:

c. Legal constrains: The statebuilding policy is associated with an increase in disciplinary sanctions of municipal civil servants; more sanctions of civil servants indicate that state institutions are making an effort to control local government behavior.

d. Normative constrains: The statebuilding policy is associated with an increase in social mobilization; a high number of collective actions such as manifestations, protests, marches, etc. by civil society is indicative of a greater will and potential capacity to control corruption.

Given the limitations of statebuilding initiatives to promote transitions to good governance (in the sense that these interventions can amplify the existing governance order and institutional dynamics, as was indicated in the literature review), it is expected that the Consolidation Policy has little effect to increase the control of corruption in the short term. Three reasons guided the selection of the hypotheses and variables analyzed. First, the variables are policy actionable, following the criteria of the Index of Public Integrity, and are related to the efforts of the Consolidation Policy. Second, the availability and coverage of the data. There are some transparency indexes at the municipal level in Colombia, but they are limited a few cities, and thus, they are not useful to assess the public integrity in conflict affected regions. Third, the variables are continuously updated, which allows the development of a monitoring system eventually. A final note of precaution is presented before presenting the policy inputs. This study has an important limitation as it has not validated if the operationalization of the dependent variables in this research actually captures public integrity and control of corruption, as it is tested in Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2016). It would have been ideal to test the correlation between the selected variables in this research and some sort of corruption measurement in the context of conflict-affected regions; however, the availability of data limited this, as mentioned above. The selection of the dependent variables, therefore, is based on the theoretical framework of the Control of Corruption Equilibrium Model, and on the evidence from other studies discussed in the previous sections. That being the case, an assumption of this research is that the dependent variables presented in table two are indeed related to the control of corruption.

Table 2. Index of Public Integrity and operationalization

Control of corruption factor	Index of Public Integrity	Operationalization in the Colombian post-conflict context
Opportunities	Power discretion	Accountability by the local government to citizens
Opportunities	Material resources	Transparency in public procurement
Constraints	Legal	Disciplinary sanctions of civil servants
Constraints	Normative	Number of civil society collective actions

Source: Operationalization based on Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2016).

d. Consolidation policy inputs

Graph two shows the active number of projects by type and semester. The information is limited to the projects in which USAID was involved. The notion of "quick impact projects" can be seen in the intensive period between 2012 and 2013. The infrastructure and economic development projects were constant activities throughout the implementation. It is important to note that the implementation on the field, only started after 2011.

Graph 2. Active number of CELI projects by type and semester



Source: Own elaboration with data from USAID (2018).

5. Analytic strategy

a. Methodology

Did the Consolidation Policy affect the variables that incentivize the control of corruption? The estimation of this relationship has to face some challenges. First, there is an issue of inverse causality to address. The model has to account for the fact that the policy was not randomly targeted. The policy concentrated in regions with low institutional presence and strong armed in-

surgency activity. In addition, omitted variables, such as the intensity of the armed conflict and the presence of illegal economies, can bias the analysis. To deal with these kind of challenges, the scholars doing research on Colombia have relied on longitudinal and differences-in-differences (DD) strategies. Higuera (2017) implements a DD strategy to identify the electoral effects of territorial control of armed actors. García (2009) uses longitudinal information to identify the trajectories of violence in Colombian municipalities and thus establishes whether they are under control or in dispute. Alvis, Hidalgo and Rodríguez (2017) study the effects of the armed conflict in Colombia over the municipalities' income and expenditure of investment using a DD strategy.

The DD strategy in this research consists of measuring the effect of an intervention using two groups, one intervention and one control. The logic of this identification consists of the existence of two groups with a parallel longitudinal tendency that allows the intervention group to have a counterfactual to measure the "effect" of the intervention on an outcome of interest. The analyzed period in this research is from 2010 to 2015, after this year the Consolidation Policy came to an end[3]. This DD setting captures "the effect" of the Consolidation Policy after 2011, when the CP was reformed and CELI was rolled out. The intervention group is composed of 33 municipalities that received the joint action of the Colombian government and USAID. The control group is 1,052 municipalities in Colombia that were not treated under the Consolidation Policy. The control group excludes 16 municipalities that were treated exclusively by the Colombian government and not by USAID. One of the advantages of the DD strategy is that it controls for the preintervention differences between the intervention and control groups, thus eliminating possible endogeneity in the treatment selection. One of the basic assumptions for the DD strategy is the equal trends assumption between control and intervention. Gertler et al. (2016) suggests three alternative ways to provide evidence for the parallel trend assumption in the absence of at least two pretreatment serial observations. Since the dependent variables used in this document were collected beginning in 2010, there is only one pretreatment observation. Therefore, two of researchers' alternative ways are used to test the equal trends assumption: an estimation with a different control, and second, a "fake" intervention group. Annex two presents the means of the control and intervened groups for the accountability and procurement transparency.

This is the estimated equation Y_{it} captures the dependent variable for municipality *i* in year *t*. The intervention variable is T_{it}, the period of intervention (2011-2015) is captured by $YearsT_{it}$. The coefficient of interaction $T * YearsT_{it}$ captures the policy effect. Municipality $\lambda_i$and year γ_t fixed effects are included to capture the municipal fixed characteristics (natural resources, altitude, etc.) and changes in the annual trends of other characteristics and also of the dependent variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Following the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption, the vector X_{it} includes time variant structural characteristics that are out of the control of the intervention. These variables control for the differences in the compositions of untreated and treated municipalities: the number of hectares of coca crops, presence of guerrilla and number of armed conflict victims per every 10,000 inhabitants. All the models correct for municipality clustered standard errors.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 T_{it} + \beta_2 YearsT_{it} + \beta_3 T * YearsT_{it} + \beta_4 X_{it} + \lambda_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

The dependent variables to be analyzed by the proposed DD model are procurement transparency and accountability by the local government to local citizens. The main independent variable is the presence of the Consolidation Policy. For the variables of corruption constrains, disciplinary sanctions and social mobilization, it was not possible to get all the necessary information for the DD. Therefore, a qualitative assessment is performed comparing the trends of the intervened

3 USAID continued its activities but without a clear government counterpart, according to interview data.

municipalities with a counterfactual of municipalities determined by other researchers (Núñez et al., 2016). In annex three, the procedure used by these authors is described. In short, they identified a group of municipalities that had not been intervened but did have similar characteristics to those intervened municipalities in the components of: illegal economies, insurgent armed activity, intensity of armed conflict, criminal activity, property tax collection and education coverage.

b. Data

The first hypothesis measures the association between power discretion and the Consolidation Policy. For this research, the degree of accountability can be a proxy of power discretion. The National Planning Department is the national level executive administrative agency of Colombia in charge of defining, recommending and promoting public and economic policy. It has the mission of defining and promoting the establishment of a strategic vision of the country in the social, economic and environmental sectors through the design, orientation and evaluation of public policies in Colombia, the management and allocation of public investment, the definition of frameworks for the performance of the private sector and the realization of government plans, programs and projects.

This government entity collects the data for the accountability index in all Colombian municipalities with the same standards. The concept of accountability is understood as "an expression of social control that includes actions for requesting information and explanations, as well as the evaluation of public office. The purpose of this process is to seek transparency in the management of the Public Administration, and from there, achieve the adoption of the principles of Good Governance, efficiency, effectiveness and transparency" (Comité De Apoyo Técnico De La Política De Rendición De Cuentas, 2014). Measured as a zero-to-one index, where zero means less accountability, the municipalities self-report their advancements in the components of: frequency of accountability actions (such as public hearings), quality and accessibility of information, level of citizen participation, and quality of dialogue between civil society and the municipality, and feedback. Annex four presents all the questions for this indicator.

The second hypothesis assesses the relationship between the policy and fiscal procurement transparency. This research follows the methodology of the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia (Procuraduría), according to which, procurement transparency is measured as a zero-to-one index that captures the difference between the annual contracts published by a municipal local government in the electronic public procurement system of the National Procurement Agency (Colombia Compra Eficiente) and the annual contracts reported by the same municipal local government to Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría). Both reported numbers must coincide (the index is equal to one); therefore, the higher the difference, the lower the fiscal transparency (zero transparency equals to zero coincidence). The Office of the Inspector General of Colombia is an independent public institution overseeing the public conduct of those in authority or in charge of exercising a public office, and of overseeing the correct functioning of other government institutions and agencies. The office is not a judicial institution, but rather one of the Colombian Control Institutions, alongside the Office of the Comptroller General. The Inspector General is also charged with safeguarding the rights of the people, guaranteeing human rights protection and intervening in the name of the people in the defense of the public's interest.

Table three summarizes the variables included in the DD estimation. Controls of the model are the number of coca hectares, rate of armed conflict victims per every 10,000 inhabitants and a dummy for guerrilla presence: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Both control and intervention groups have a similar average of variable accountability and public procurement transparency, which are the variables estimated in the DD. In a t-test for procurement transparency and accountability, the null hypothesis with a 1% significance is not rejected. According to this result, a DD is an appropriate method to identify the policy effect.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics (2010-2015)

	Control				
VARIABLES	Observations	Mean	Stan. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Coca Hectares	6,438	34.69	192.6	0	3,468
Rate of armed conflict victims	6,438	79.95	194.8	0	5,831
National Liberation Army	6,438	0.0623	0.242	0	1
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	6,438	0.192	0.394	0	1
Procurement transparency	6,312	49.64	31.52	0	100
Accountability	6,312	52.50	26.15	0	100
	Intervention				
Coca Hectares	198	499.1	1,583	0	16,960
Rate of armed conflict victims	198	367.8	377.9	12.07	4,058
National Liberation Army	198	0.146	0.354	0	1
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	198	0.763	0.427	0	1
Procurement transparency	196	49.22	32.78	0	100
Accountability	196	50.27	28.26	0	100

Source: Own elaboration.

The third hypothesis is related to the effectiveness of disciplinary sanctions to local government public officials. The Inspector General of Colombia imposes a disciplinary sanction when a public servant engages in conducts that lead to the breach of duties, overreaching in the exercise of rights and functions, prohibitions and violation of the regime of disabilities, legal incompatibilities, impediments and conflicts of interest. Disciplinary sanctions include suspension, dismissal, fines, warnings, arrest, loss of position and termination of employment contract. Despite the fact that other agencies are also supposed to oversee the public officials, this research limits the analysis to the Procuraduría sanctions because this entity covers the whole country and is representative of the efforts of Colombian State entities to provide legal control of the local government.

Finally, in regard to the fourth hypothesis, the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP) captures the information of civil society collective actions such as protests, manifestations, etc[4]. For CINEP, social mobilization is understood as "contentious collective action" (Barrera et al., 2016). This concept follows the theoretical contribution of Sidney Tarrow (2014) who posits that the "contentious collective action" refers to all episodic, public and collective interaction between groups that express their claims and their adversaries when: the government is the object of the claims, and the claims, if addressed, would affect the interests of those who lead the collective struggles or of the object to which they direct their claims. Therefore, social mobilization expresses itself and becomes visible when: i) there is a collective assessment of a situation considered as unfair or conflictive (Gurr, 1974), ii) there are available resources that allow the coordinated action (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983), and iii) a structure of political opportunity that manifests grievances publicly (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). Annex four has links to the data. Finally, the semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and April 2018. Annex six includes a list of all people interviewed. The final sample comprises Colombian government and USAID officials.

4 There are several categories: civil resistance actions; cultural events; acts of memory; acts of reconciliation, celebrations; collective communications; declarations of peace zones; dialogues and negotiations; public meetings, forums; marches and concentrations; organization and coordination; stoppages, strikes and uprisings; electoral participation; prizes and tributes; citizen concertation processes; public policy proposals; collection of signatures; road blocks.

6. Results

a. Accountability

Table four estimates the average effect of the Consolidation Policy during the intervention period of 2011-2015. While the group of municipalities that did not receive the policy has an average of 55.1 percentage points in the accountability index, the group of consolidation municipalities has an average of 63.4 percentage points. The joint effort of the Colombian government and USAID seems to be associated with an average increase of 8.3 percentage points in the index of accountability. This result has a statistical significance of 10 percent. Table four shows different model specifications. The effect is robust in the inclusion of variables that control differences in the groups (rate of armed conflict victims, presence of guerrillas and coca hectares), fixed characteristics of the municipalities, and other characteristics that vary annually. These results indicate that the Consolidation Policy was associated with a higher capacity of local governments to provide better information, a greater presence of representatives of social organizations in the various accountability mechanisms, and finally more frequent and higher quality of dialogue. In annex two, the parallel trends are visualized, and a changed control group, a placebo, and a third test provide some evidence that the equal trends assumption is met, and thus the result is robust.

Table 4. Average effect of consolidation on local government accountability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Municipal FE	Controls and Municipal FE	Municipal and Year FE	Controls Municipal and Year FE
Year	-3.061***	-3.238***	-19.97***	-2.068**
	(0.733)	(0.742)	(1.175)	(0.886)
Consolidation Policy Effect	8.733*	8.525*	8.733*	8.284*
	(4.984)	(4.742)	(4.986)	(4.815)
Coca Hectares		-0.00512***		-0.00384***
		(0.00165)		(0.00132)
Rate of armed conflict victims		-0.00212		-0.00308
		(0.00225)		(0.00255)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia		-3.507**		0.188
		(1.398)		(1.251)
National Liberation Army		-0.401		1.497
		(2.107)		(1.940)
Constant	54.76***	56.13***	54.76***	55.07***
	(0.605)	(0.734)	(0.605)	(0.720)
Observations	6,508	6,508	6,508	6,508
R-squared	0.003	0.005	0.187	0.188
Number of municipalities	1,085	1,085	1,085	1,085
Year FE	NO	NO	YES	YES
Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Source: Own elaboration.

The Consolidation Policy's effect was not constant throughout the studied time period. The analyzed period of 2010-2015 coincides with 2012-2015 term of office for mayors. The Consolidation Policy is associated with greater accountability at the beginning and end of a mayor's mandate. One possible interpretation of the increase in accountability in 2012 is that the Consolidation Policy took advantage of the obligation for mayors to generate a mandatory development plan. This plan is the document that indicates objectives, guidelines, programs, sources of financing and budgets of public policies formulated by the mayor for each year of his or her mandate. When the USAID program was rolled out in 2011, the first activities were mostly "massive" participatory workshops that brought together local government and civil society to identify needs, demands, local partners and their capacities. As can be seen in Graph 3 below, or in more detail in table six of annex one, which estimates the effect of the Consolidation Policy for each year from 2011 to 2015, in year 2012 there was an increase of 9.1 percentage points in the accountability index with respect to municipalities without intervention. In 2015, there was an increase of approximately seven percentage points in the accountability index. In 2013 and 2014, the sign of the relationship is negative but not statistically significant. This suggests that the local electoral dynamics might be positively related to accountability. It is possible that mayors engaged their constituents more and increased the level of accountability with the expectation of improving the electoral possibilities of a political ally.

Graph 3. 2011-2015 comparison of the consolidation effect on accountability by year



Source: Own elaboration.

b. Procurement transparency

In the logic of the equilibrium theory of control of corruption model, budget transparency is related to material resources and power discretion. Table five estimates the Consolidation Policy's effect in public procurement transparency in the treated municipalities compared to the rest of the municipalities in the country treated during 2011-2015. According to the results, it seems that the policy is not associated with changes in procurement transparency in any of the specifications. A possibility is that the metric used, the difference of contracts reported to different national government agencies, does not properly capture the effect on transparency, and therefore other measurements could tell a different story.

Table 5. Effect of the consolidation policy on procurement transparency

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Municipal FE	Controls and Municipal FE	Municipal and Year FE	Controls Municipal and Year FE
Year	20.29***	20.06***	0.777	21.00***
	(0.848)	(0.851)	(0.851)	(1.177)
Consolidation Policy Effect	1.085	0.901	1.085	0.851
	(4.121)	(4.157)	(4.122)	(4.118)
Coca Hectares		-0.00274*		-0.00205
		(0.00164)		(0.00195)
Rate of armed conflict victims		0.000392		-0.000120
		(0.00222)		(0.00192)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia		-4.238***		0.284
		(1.435)		(1.350)
National Liberation Army		1.483		2.171
		(2.128)		(2.026)
Constant	32.68***	33.79***	32.68***	32.58***
	(0.693)	(0.816)	(0.693)	(0.830)
Observations	6,508	6,508	6,508	6,508
R-squared	0.089	0.091	0.229	0.230
Number of municipalities	1,085	1,085	1,085	1,085
Year FE	NO	NO	YES	YES
Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Source: Own elaboration.

Despite this result, according to the collected interview data and ethnographies on municipalities that received intervention under the Consolidation Policy (Marin and Espinosa, 2017), there were limitations in improving local governments' capacity to have more visible and transparent budgets. Before the intervention, budget transparency was low, especially due to the strong territorial control of the FARC. According to interview data, the armed group extorted public resources by requesting an "authorization" of around 20 to 30 percent of the total cost of public investment projects. The prices used to be artificially inflated to pay such "authorization."

In order to increase transparency, after the official armed forces gained territorial control, the Consolidation Policy's intervention tried to strengthen citizen oversight and promote a culture of budget transparency for local government officials. The Consolidation Policy encouraged civil society to act through the structures known as the Community Action Councils (JAC - "Junta de Acción Comunal"). First, accompanied by Consolidation Policy workers, the JAC administered public works of low complexity prioritized by the Community Action Council. It was expected that in such way, the community would increase expertise in managing resources and projects, and eventually the citizens would have the capacity to better control the mayor's office directly. According to interview data, and some evidence (Marin and Espinosa, 2017), during the implementation phase the resources were not co-opted by clientele networks, execution times were reduced, extortion was reduced to five percent, and trust between communities and local governments increased. With more social control over budgets, communities managed to work together with local institutions.

Upon the close of CP operations in 2015, however, the model lost its effect. The CP could not end the practice of extortion of public resources. According to interview data, previously performed by the FARC, the practice persisted and in some municipalities even worsened. One of the possible causes is the heavy rotation of local government officials. It was difficult for the CP to leave installed capacity and thus produce sustainable effects. Furthermore, the CP did not have proper mechanisms to deal with corrupt mayors. According to interview data, CP officials tried to partner with mid-lev-

el and non-corrupt local government officials and, when appropriate, denounced corrupt practices to the public control institutions, such as the Office of the Inspector General. However, this was ineffective, due to the low capabilities of judicial and control institutions in those municipalities.

c. Social mobilization

The Consolidation Policy's civil society strengthening policy had two objectives. First, to organize and institutionalize the fragmented citizen demands, and to generate an autonomous civil-society voice. The second objective was to build trust in the Colombian State. There were two ways to achieve this. In the first year of the intervention, participatory mass workshops were held to identify and prioritize the needs of the population. The objective was to have a sufficiently diverse citizen group to prevent clientelist leaders from monopolizing civil society presentation. Second, sub-municipal workshops were held in subsequent stages to strengthen the technical capacities of community participation boards at the neighborhood level, known as Community Action Councils (JACs). One of the community leaders interviewed said: "We were like old cars because we went from workshop to workshop." These workshops with the JACs promoted new leadership like groups of young people and women. The JAC's also promoted the oversight of public spending and community empowerment. The Consolidation Policy worked directly with these community structures allowing them to manage small infrastructure projects with low technical complexity.

The program tried to facilitate the creation of civil society organizations with the capacity to coordinate and advocate for their interests at the local and regional level. While the policy empowered grassroots organizations, giving them a stronger voice when interacting with local governments, and serving as a counterweight to the insurgent groups, the policy did not directly promote social mobilization such as marches or actions of resistance. However, it is possible to argue that this increase in the social capital among citizens and greater organizational capabilities led to greater social mobilization, especially considering the improved security situation. In the logic of the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption Model, a population of autonomous and critical citizens capable of collective action can "amplify the transparency effects in combating corruption" (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2016). Anti-corruption efforts only become "significant" when civil society uses the anti-corruption instruments for real social scrutiny (ibid).

Graph three shows the social mobilization (measured as protests, marches, resistance actions, acts of memory, etc.) in municipalities that received intervention under the Consolidation Policy (represented in blue), and a group of municipalities with similar characteristics that did not receive intervention (represented in red). Instances of social mobilization in individual municipalities are appear on the graph as thin lines, while the mean of the two groups is represented with thick lines. Annex three describes how the comparison group was selected. As the graph shows, after 2011 (when the government and USAID started the joint effort) the number of social collective actions slightly increased in those municipalities that received intervention, while those without intervention maintained a constant number of collective actions. It is not clear if this trend will consolidate over time, though.

As the graph indicates, a small group of municipalities had at least ten or more mobilizations per year after 2011. Intervened municipalities with the highest number of social mobilizations coincide with a high degree of victimization by the armed conflict. One of these municipalities is El Carmen de Bolívar, located in the north of Colombia. Between 1997 and 2000, when the municipality was relatively prosperous due to its tobacco and cattle industry, paramilitaries and guerrillas fought for territorial control of the municipality. One of the worst massacres in Colombia happened there in 2000, when about 500 paramilitaries murdered 66 people "accused" of supporting the FARC guerrilla. Over the years, the families displaced by violence have returned slowly and today are an example of empowering a society to rebuild after the conflict. Another example is Briceño in the department of Antioquia, the first selected munic-

ipality in 2015 to implement the first peace process humanitarian actions, such as demining (Cruz, 2016). This suggests that the population is manifesting to the presence of the program.

Graph 4. Social mobilizations by municipality and year



Source: Own elaboration with data from CINEP.

According to ethnographic (Marin and Espinosa, 2017) and interview data, the policy of consolidation had a double effect in the direction of promoting greater social mobilization. First, this is expressed by the program's emphasis on institutionalizing and strengthening the voice of citizens, and by extension, having a better dialogue with the local government. Second, the Consolidation Policy indirectly motivated social mobilization because some communities felt discriminated against by the policy and reacted. This is might be related to the counterinsurgency legacy reflected in the Consolidation Policy design.

As mentioned above, the policy had sequential logic: Recovery, Transition and Stabilization. The activities aiming to strengthen civil society could only start in the Transition phase, only when the security improved. The instrument to determine the degree of security was a "traffic light" system, which assessed the security risks. When the traffic light was red, development activities could not start. When it was yellow, it was possible to start the Transition phase; when it was green, it was possible to start the Stabilization activities.

According to the interviews collected, since there were no clear guidelines to classify the security threats, military personnel had a high degree of discretion when selecting where to implement the policy. According to the interview data, this discretion of the "traffic light" system generated problems. Military personnel assessed the municipality's security in the the vereda, sub-levels of municipalities. As a result of assessment at the vereda level, there were cases when some municipalities' veredas received intervention while other veredas did not, generating problems of illegitimacy as the neighboring veredas that coexisted with the insurgency were the less likely to benefit from the program. According to the interviews, implementation was biased towards veredas where implementation was easiest, that is, more concentrated in urban regions of the municipalities and less in the rural regions, where insurgencies tended to have greater influence. Veredas that coexisted with the insurgency (and therefore, were less likely to receive the

intervention) tended to feel discriminated against and excluded from neighboring veredas that received the policy benefits. This may have been one of the additional reasons for the increase in social mobilization. As one of the community leaders interviewed pointed out: "After the military campaign, they (the Consolidation Policy workers) invented this fake division of good people who live in the urban area and the bad guys, and guerrillas in the countryside" (González et al, 2017).

In light thereof, the Consolidation Policy lost an opportunity to have a greater impact working with the JACs in the more rural and remote regions. One mistake that the Consolidation Policy made was having assumed that all the JACs in the regions with an insurgency presence were all co-opted. The JACs are important structures in the regions where consolidation took place (González et al, 2017). They provide important local public goods such as documents in which the possession of land, its boundaries, the activities of the residents and their residence time are recognized. Additionally, JACs serve farmers who do not have formal property titles to access loans with Banco Agrario[5] or benefit from cattle vaccination campaigns. More importantly, the JACs are basic instances of coordination among the settlers and collective bargaining with armed groups and local political powers. Following Arjona (2008), even in contexts of territorial control of armed actors, civil society can resist and partially oppose the armed ruling.

d. Legal constraints

Following the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption, legal constraints to corruption are related to "an autonomous, accountable, and effective judiciary", which is the basis for horizontal accountability, such as courts or audit agencies controlling the government (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2016). According to its objectives, the CP "implies the coordinated action of the military capacity, to guarantee the recovery of territorial security, of the police and the justice system, to consolidate citizen protection, justice and of the rest of the state institutions responsible for providing the conditions and services for economic and social development, the integration of the territory and its inhabitants into the economic, social and institutional life of the country" (Consolidación, 2014).

Consolidation was planned to work as a coordination mechanism that combines the presence of police, control agencies and the judicial branch, especially in the "Transition" phase. It seems that in the short term, Consolidation did not increase the control of local governments by the agencies like the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia (Procuraduría), which has the sanctionatory and preventive functions. Despite the fact that other agencies are also supposed to oversee the public officials, this research limits the analysis to the Procuraduría sanctions because this entity covers the whole country and is representative of the efforts of state entities to oversee local public servants.

Graph four compares the disciplinary sanctions (dismissal, fines, warnings, arrest, loss of position and termination of contract) against local government officials imposed by this agency. The Consolidation municipalities are blue and a group of municipalities with similar characteristics that did not receive intervention are represented by red. The graph shows the mean of the groups in thick lines and the individual municipalities in thinner lines. As the graph shows, the mean of the groups remains stable in the analyzed period. However, the non-treated municipalities seem to perform slightly better. This unexpected result calls for further future analysis.

5 The main objective of this public bank is to provide banking services in rural areas and to finance agricultural activities.

Graph 5. Disciplinary sanctions



Source: Own elaboration with data from the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia.

At the national level, the justice sector receives about USD$1 in investment for every USD$7 invested in defense (Hartzell et al 2011). Although there is no data available to check, this relationship might be worse in the Consolidation areas. In the Macarena region, where the security has improved, there are only two officials from the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia (Procuraduría) who "lack the police protection needed to carry out their tasks and are, in many cases, subject to harassment or extortion by illegal groups" (Hartzell et al 2011). Also, their capacity to sanction local government officials is even harder due to inadequate funding, lack of personnel, capacity and protection.

e. Technocracy out of the program, a measure of political consolidation?

Overall, this research has found modest evidence that the Consolidation Policy increased control of corruption. Despite USAID rolling out its complementary program in 2011, the policy did not significantly improve its effect on "consolidating" the Colombian State or significantly improving the variables that promote the control of corruption. Since policies do not take place in a vacuum, this section provides some context regarding the political factors that affected its efficacy. According to interview data, there are two relevant factors: the politicization of the policy, and the peace dialogues held between the government and the FARC.

Between 2012 and 2013, the program started to be heavily used by the national government as a mechanism to pay political favors to regional politicians, which increased coordination costs with USAID and therefore decreased the program's effectiveness. In September 2012, clientelistic pressures forced the director of the program, Álvaro Balcázar, to resign. Considered a technocrat, Balcázar served since 2007 as the director of both the pilot and the national expansion of the CP (La Silla Vacía, 2016, interviews). The director of the 2010 presidential campaign in the department of Nariño, Germán Chamorro de la Rosa, was appointed to the position of program director. He is a politician from that region, and a veterinarian with no experience on development. Politicization was not only at the top managerial level positions but also at the intermediate level. According to interview data, the regional managers who coordinated the policy in the departments were replaced by people "recommended" by members of congress (La Silla Vacía, 2012).

USAID officials were concerned with the increasing politicization of the Consolidation Policy, not only at the level of the public officials in charge of the implementation and administration of the program, but also in regard to the poor strategic direction in the top executive ministerial cabinet (Isacson, 2012). From 2011 to 2015, four different ministers proposed different policy approaches without any contextual input. According to an ex-CP government official: "the ministers said that small scale infrastructure projects are useless, but instead, what is needed are big infrastructure projects. They never understood that CP is for trust building. They never understood the philosophy of the program."

As a result of the politicization of the CP, the program lost consistency between the proposed objectives and the actual field activities. Particularly the phased logic of the program weakened. Program donors and USAID noted that the Colombian government was struggling to move from the "Transition" phase, during which the military was the main actor, to "Stabilization", a phase where local civilian authorities lead the Consolidation Policy. Therefore, the establishment of an effective civilian leadership in the regions was delayed more than planned. As shown by Isacson (2012), "the civilian part of Colombia's government is proving extremely slow to show up in the Consolidation zones." By the end of 2015, the Consolidation Policy withered and closed its operations, leaving USAID's CELI without a government counterpart.

There is an additional contextual element that also explains why many of the technical government officials left the program. The CP technical officials not only left the program because of its politicization, but also to support the peace dialogues held between the government and the FARC. By 2014, after two years of official peace talks between the FARC and the government, it had become increasingly evident for the Colombian government that a peace deal was possible. Thus, with real hope of an actual peace agreement, it made less sense for the Colombian Government to focus on a program that conceived the FARC guerrilla as an obstacle instead of considering them as a possible of partner to consolidate state presence.

7. Research limitations

There are three main limitations that limit the inference of the relationship between the Consolidation Policy and the control of corruption. First, the operationalization of control of corruption dimensions is far from perfect, as mentioned before. It is difficult to check the internal validity of the indexes used. In other words, it is difficult to know if the dependent variables reflect the dimensions of control of corruption that should be captured. Further research should use different measures of these concepts to increase the certainty of the analytic inference. To partially solve this problem, the selection of indicators was based on the theoretical criterion of the Index of Public Integrity, which is based on the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption. This research tried to provide a counterfactual to assess the association of the Consolidation Policy. However, doubts remain with regard to the reliability for the difference-in-difference control group selection. This is why different robustness checks were carried out. To some extent, they provide some support that the identification method captures the effects of the policy on control of corruption variables analyzed. While these checks do not fully resolve the endogeneity of the intervention, they do provide some evidence that the policy effect on accountability is well-contained.

Finally, this research has focused on the short-term effects of the Consolidation Policy, and this may explain the limited results of the intervention described in the previous section. As mentioned at the beginning of the research, it may be that further effects are noticed in the long term. However, given the importance of generating positive peace dividends for the communities and thus avoiding relapse into the conflict, it is important to understand the scope and limitations of the policy in the short term.

8. Conclusions and policy recommedations

As Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston (2017) argue, corruption is the cause and effect of the basic weakness in the state's ability to govern in ways that are credible for citizens and spoilers. In the case of the Consolidation Policy, despite gains in security, the Colombian government has not yet successfully transitioned to a governance regime that would impose the economic regulation of modern capitalism, democracy and the values and behaviors of modern citizenship in the conflict-affected regions. The 2016 demobilization of the FARC and the implementation of the peace agreement has opened a window of opportunity to produce greater inclusion and control of corruption in the regions affected by the armed conflict. This is why it is important to learn about the limitations and achievements of past government efforts. This research has focused the analysis of the Consolidation Policy's on the control of corruption, and has learned about limitations and achievements of this policy to shape governance in the short term.

The analysis is based in the Equilibrium Theory of Control of Corruption. Following this theory, the Index of Public Integrity was operationalized in the context of the post-conflict Colombia. Then, the research traced the possible changes produced by the policy on the control of corruption factors. In line with the literature reviewed, the analysis revealed a limited and mixed effect of Consolidation on control of corruption in the short term. The results presented above showed that the Consolidation Policy was associated to more collective actions, at least in a group of municipalities, and an increase in local government accountability for the citizens. On the contrary, there seems to be no association of the policy with local government procurement transparency, and legal constraints measured as disciplinary sanctions by the Office of the Inspector General, one of the control state agencies. The research has identified two main issues that limited the effect of the Consolidation Policy on the control of corruption: the quick-impact approach and relying too much on institutions of the Colombian government to produce good governance, and less on civil society.

The "quick impact" approach failed to acknowledge the dilemma of the statebuilding policies between promoting stability or changes in governance. Statebuilding policies tend to become instrumental in maintaining the status quo for the winners of corruption, as was mentioned in the literature review. In the case of the Consolidation Policy, which was based on the quick-impact approach, the "purchase of peace" limited the effect that the policy would have had on the control of corruption. In municipalities where Consolidation Policy intervention took place, expectations regarding improvements in good governance of the civil society were only partially fulfilled. Moreover, the quick impact approach produced unsustainable results. For example, as mentioned in the results section, extortion of public resources declined while the program operated, but extortion increased after Consolidation closed operations in 2015.

A solution to this dilemma has to acknowledge two dimensions: the need to dissuade the good governance spoilers, which are the actors that capture and spoil the state, and secondly, the need to protect the critical mass of citizens that call for good governance from the violence of the governance spoilers. To partly solve this hard balance, Johnson (2010) proposed "a gradualist strategy of reduced insecurity that reduces elite resistance to such changes. That approach offers those leaders the means and opportunity to respond to change and challenges in ways that may be collusive, even corrupt, but are much less likely to be violent or to undermine basic state institutions." This implies a long-term approach which would provide public and safe spaces allowing citizens to gather strength and gradually check corruption. To increase the effectiveness of such measures, and depending on an assessment of the security conditions, whistleblower-protection programs may offer

opportunities for change. To conclude, the approach would have to balance the need of civil society protection, while at the same time creating real opportunities the civil society to control the state.

The proposed gradualist approach should have included much more input of civil society. In regard to the second reason for limited results in the control of corruption, the Consolidation Policy showed that it was possible to strengthen citizen groups, and to promote collective action, even considering the counterinsurgent component of the policy that prevented a more solid partnership from materializing. Given that this policy was too narrowly focused on the state institutions, it did not properly consider other local actors that also shaped governance. As a USAID official underscores: "The (central) government is disconnected from what happens in the regions. To them there is no more consideration than the local mayor, they do not consider more actors in the territory." This study follows the recommendation of Eickhoff et al. (2017) that in the context of a weak state, statebuilding should be complemented with governance building, and civil society is a primary actor in this statebuilding. The state institutions need local input provided by civil society. This is done through a careful consideration of the local ways through which governance is exercised. To some extent, the Colombian government is already taking this approach in the programs that followed Consolidation. One example is the program to substitute coca crops. First, the affected communities are consulted and then a plan is co-designed to gradually substitute the coca. Another example is the private companies investing in the construction of rural roads and infrastructure in exchange for an attractive tax reduction. Therefore, government officials should keep in mind that the objective is not to build the state as an end, but rather to use the state as a means in order to build good governance.

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10. Annexes

a. 2011-2015 accountability effect comparison

Table 6. 2011-2015 comparison of the consolidation effect on accountability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
2011	-2.825				
	(5.785)				
2012		9.083**			
		(4.352)			
2013			-2.719		
			(4.732)		
2014				-1.905	
				(4.556)	
2015					6.952*
					(3.784)
Constant	56.28***	54.31***	50.23***	53.11***	53.53***
	(0.387)	(0.367)	(0.367)	(0.385)	(0.391)
Observations	6,508	6,508	6,508	6,508	6,508
R-squared	0.115	0.009	0.102	0.004	0.003
Number of municipalities	1,085	1,085	1,085	1,085	1,085
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					

Source: Own elaboration.

b. Robustness checks

In regard to the empirical strategy, this study estimates the effect of the government and USAID's joint effort comparing the 33 intervened municipalities with the rest of the municipalities in Colombia, excluding 16 municipalities intervened exclusively by the national government, which leaves 1,052 municipalities as a control group. The time dummy for the interaction is the year 2011.

The objective of the following estimations is to provide evidence for the equal trends assumption, and also to check if the observed effect of the intervention on responsiveness is well contained in the actual 33 intervened municipalities. Gertler et al. (2016) suggests three alternative ways to provide additional evidence for the equal trend assumption in the ab-

sence of at least two pre-intervention serial observations. Following Gertler et al., and since I only have one pre-intervention observation from 2010, I implement two of the alternative ways: an estimation with a reduced control, and second, a "fake" intervention group. As an additional test, the spillover effect estimations check how well-contained the policy effect is in the surrounding municipalities. All the estimations correct for municipal clustered standard errors, and when it is indicated, include year, municipal fixed effects and the rest of the controls.

- Accountability

At least visually, it seems that there are parallel trends before the intervention began.

Graph 6. Parallel trends of accountability index 1



Source: Own elaboration with data from Office of the Inspector General of Colombia

- Reduced control

Table Seven shows the estimations of the reduced control that excludes the municipalities of the departments where there was no intervention. In other words, the actual intervened municipalities are compared to other municipalities that did not receive an intervention but are located in the same department, as can be noticed by the reduction in the number of observations. In this estimation, the effect is significant in all the estimations, and is around a ten percentage points increase in the accountability of the local government. This shows that the effect is maintained.

Table 7. Reduced control for accountability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Municipal FE	Controls and Municipal FE	Municipal and Year FE	Controls Municipal and Year FE
Year	-5.420***	-5.904***	-20.21***	-4.600***
	(1.228)	(1.256)	(1.929)	(1.598)
did_department	11.09**	11.45**	11.09**	11.22**
	(5.086)	(4.893)	(5.091)	(4.918)
Constant	54.98***	56.94***	54.97***	55.30***
	(1.000)	(1.449)	(1.001)	(1.425)
Observations	2,296	2,296	2,296	2,296
R-squared	0.007	0.012	0.175	0.177
Number of municipalities	383	383	383	383
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	YES	YES
Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Source: Own elaboration.

- Placebo

In this test, random fake treatments were assigned to the municipalities of the intervened departments. Then, excluding those municipalities that were actually intervened, two estimations are computed. Table Eight shows the results with the rest of the country's municipalities as a control and table Nine with a control reduced to the municipalities of the departments where the actual intervention occurred, in order to keep the political and economic shocks constant. As the tables eight and nine show, the coefficient of interest (placebos) is not statistically significant, which provides some evidence that the effect of the policy is well-contained and some validity regarding the equal trend assumption. While these checks do not fully resolve the endogeneity of the treatment, they do provide some evidence that the policy effect is well-contained and there is some validity of using all the municipalities in the countries as a control.

Table 8. Placebo and country control

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Municipal FE	Controls and Municipal FE	Municipal and Year FE	Controls Municipal and Year FE
Year	-3.048***	-3.240***	-19.85***	-2.174**
	(0.746)	(0.755)	(1.194)	(0.899)
Placebo Diff	-0.413	-1.135	-0.413	-0.636
	(3.948)	(3.971)	(3.949)	(3.947)
Constant	55.05***	56.52***	55.05***	55.34***
	(0.611)	(0.753)	(0.611)	(0.737)
Observations	6,312	6,312	6,312	6,312
R-squared	0.002	0.006	0.188	0.189
Number of municipalities	1,052	1,052	1,052	1,052
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	YES	YES

Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 9. Placebo and reduced control

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Municipal FE	Controls and Municipal FE	Municipal and Year FE	Controls Municipal and Year FE
Year	23.00***	22.94***	23.66***	23.88***
	(1.616)	(1.616)	(2.001)	(2.076)
Placebo Depto Diff	-3.344	-3.470	-3.344	-3.162
	(4.460)	(4.481)	(4.464)	(4.511)
Constant	30.77***	31.16***	30.77***	30.39***
	(1.261)	(1.655)	(1.262)	(1.818)
Observations	2,100	2,100	2,100	2,100
R-squared	0.117	0.117	0.245	0.246
Number of municipalities	350	350	350	350
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	YES	YES
Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Source: Own elaboration.

- Spillover

Table Ten estimates the spillover effect of the accountability policy. The estimations include year and municipal fixed effects. The interventions are changed to the municipalities in radii of 30, 50 and 70 km. The actual intervened municipalities were omitted. The results show that the effect of the statebuilding program on responsiveness increases the closer the municipalities are from the real intervention and becomes negative the further away. None of the results are statistically significant, which suggests that the effect is well-contained.

Table 10. Spillover

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	30 KM	50 KM	70 KM
did_dist30	2.207		
	(5.087)		
did_dist50		-0.526	
		(3.197)	
did_dist70			-1.279
			(2.079)
Constant	55.33***	55.33***	55.34***
	(0.737)	(0.738)	(0.737)
Observations	6,306	6,306	6,306
R-squared	0.189	0.189	0.189
Number of municipalities	1,051	1,051	1,051
Controls	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES

Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

Source: Own elaboration.

- Procurement transparency

Since the coefficients are not significant, I do not make any checking of the result, only visually. It is not very clear that te parallel trends assumptions apply before the intervention began.

Graph 7. Parallel trends of accountability index 2



Source: Own elaboration with data from Office of the Inspector General of Colombia

c. Counterfactual for corruption constraints (sanctions and civil mobilizations)

According to Núñez et al. (2016), treatment and control were grouped into 32 "clusters" using the econometric method known as propensity score matching. The method estimated correlations in terms of coca density, annual change in coca density, guerrilla attacks, paramilitary attacks, terrorist acts, massacres, rate of antipersonnel mine accidents, rate of kidnappings, rate of displacement, murder of mayors and ex-mayors, journalists, union members, councilors, teachers, property tax collected per capita, other tax collected per capita, municipal investment per capita, raw primary education coverage, raw secondary and middle education coverage. Municipalities that were similar on many of these measures were grouped into clusters. These variables compose the "Consolidation Index," based on the three policy pillars mentioned above. The following graph from Núñez et al. (2016) represents intervened municipalities (T1) by a line, and control municipalities (C1) by a dotted line; it is clear that the assumption of the parallel trends holds true, at least for the three previous years before the intervention, which allows comparisons to be made examining the municipalities on the control of corruption variables.



Source: Núñez et al. (2016).

d. Accountability index questions

These are the questions for the municipal governments to evaluate the accountability index as explained in the methodology section.

1. Does the municipality have an accountability policy being implemented?
2. Existence of online datasets with available and relevant information for citizens.
3. Contact information of citizens and interest groups to foment the citizen participation in policy formulation and implementation.
4. Existence of citizen contact information. The contact information includes the following groups: citizens, public entities, firms, social organizations, NGO, others.
5. Means of consultation for citizens: Petitions, claims and complaints; web chat; telephone; blog; interactive teleconferences; virtual forums; SMS messages; social media; web surveys; direct consultation to social organizations; others.
6. Published document that identifies accountability priorities based on civil society consultations.
7. Timeline of actions, dialogue and incentives for the accountability strategy.
8. Means used to inform citizens about accountability processes: radio, TV, press, website, mail, mobile app, social media, SMS, printed bulletins, meetings, documentation centers.
9. Existence of an accountability communication-strategy.
10. Existence of open data.
11. Mechanisms used to provide open data: inventory of available information.
12. Mechanisms used for accountability processes: participatory forums, fairs, participatory hearings, citizen observatories, dialog roundtables, local meetings, community assemblies, blogs,

social media, interactive teleconferences, other.
13. Used method in the forums held during the accountability meetings: questions and answers, workshops and roundtables, presentations, opportunities for civil society to engage in discussion.
14. Citizen groups that have attended accountability forums: academia, unions, public entities, NGO, social organizations, firms, other.
15. Communication channels that announce accountability forums: radio, TV, press, website, mail, mobile app, social media, SMS, printed bulletins, meetings, documentation centers.
16. Publication and diffusion of accountability meeting memories: electronic publication, Published on billboards or physical bulletins, sent to participants.
17. Incentives and actions included in the accountability strategy: Training public servants and citizens; participation, innovation and open collaboration; knowledge contests of the entity; and others.
18. Used means to publicize the improvement plan (a plan that includes feedback from civil society and strategies to integrate such feedback) that resulted from the accountability assessment: website; email; written communication; meeting; other.
19. Such improvement improvement plan:
a. Was included in the general annual action plan of the municipality?
b. Was used to correct and improve the management of the entity?
c. Was evaluated by citizens and interest groups after its implementation?
20. Suggestions and complaints regarding deficiencies in the management of the entity after its implementation.

e. Data sources

Data	Source	Link
Accountability	Office of the Inspector General of Colombia	http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.co/Paginas/indice-gobierno-abierto.aspx
Transparency in public procurement	Office of the Inspector General of Colombia	http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.co/Paginas/indice-gobierno-abierto.aspx
Disciplinary sanctions of civil servants	Office of the Inspector General of Colombia	http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.co/Paginas/indice-gobierno-abierto.aspx
Number of civil society collective actions	The Center for Research and Popular Education/Peace Program (CINEP)	Not publicly available. http://www.cinep.org.co/
Coca hectares	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	http://www.odc.gov.co/problematica-drogas/oferta-drogas/cultivos
Guerrilla presence	Conflict Analysis Resource Center Ministry of Defense	https://www.datoselectorales.org/#!/home https://data.humdata.org/dataset/indice-territorial-para-la-construccion-de-datos
Armed conflict victims	Unit for the Victims Assistance and Reparation	https://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV

f. Interviews

Interviewee	Organization
Anonymous I	Technical advisor - Programa Nacional Integral de sustitución voluntaria de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito
Anonymous II	Technical advisor - Management Systems Internacional - USAID contractor
Anonymous III	Technical advisor - Agencia Nacional de Tierras
Anonymous IV	Civil society leader from Vistahermosa, Meta
Anonymous V	Ex-PNRT official
Anonymous VI	Director for Defense Oversight - The Washington Office on Latin America
Anonymous VII	Regional Director - Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
Anonymous VIII	Research Associate - Management Systems Internacional
Anonymous IX	Program official - United States Agency for International Development